

CIVITAS

THE JOURNAL OF CITIZENSHIP STUDIES

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for Citizenship Studies and Department of Social Sciences (Alva)

CIVITAS: THE JOURNAL OF CITIZENSHIP STUDIES

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CIVITAS' MISSION STATEMENT

Civitas: The Journal of Citizenship Studies is an annual, interdisciplinary, peer-reviewed publishing venue aimed at promoting scholarship concerning the Humanities and Social Sciences as they relate to citizenship matters. The Journal, which is facilitated by the NWOSU Institute for Citizenship Studies and Department of Social Sciences, draws upon the talents and perspectives of a diverse Review Board from the United States and abroad. It welcomes both qualitative and quantitative submissions by faculty and advanced undergraduate and graduate students from Oklahoma's regional universities, two-year community colleges, and other institutions of higher education and beyond.

DEFINITION OF THE TERM "CIVITAS"

The term "civitas" emanates from Roman antiquity. It originally described a type of settlement or political entity. Later on, the word was used to express the condition of individuals living within the Roman state and to address whether they were full members of the Roman polity. As such, "civitas" differentiated formal citizenship status from those who were not citizens. These early Greco-Roman ideals left an indelible imprint upon the concept of citizenship in the modern Western world. Thus, the modern disciplines of the Humanities and Social Sciences are inexorably intertwined with the concept of citizenship. The word connotes the concept, quality and condition of citizenship and therefore is an appropriate word for the Institute.

EXPLANATION OF THE INSTITUTE LOGO "STATUE OF FREEDOM"

The symbol used by the Institute has appeared under a variety of names, including "The Statue of Freedom," "Armed Freedom," "Freedom," or as she was originally called, "Freedom Triumphant in War and Peace." An allegorical figure representing the concept of Liberty, it was selected to stand on the Dome of the United States Capitol because of the inclusive nature of her physical style and esoteric meanings. Her design, for example, incorporates both classical Greco-Roman and American Indian dress as well as the combination of war and peace motifs. As such, she represents both the Old and New Worlds. This figure also incorporates a number of other important features. First, she faces east toward the main entrance of the United States Capitol to symbolize that the sun never sets on Freedom. Second, the base upon which she stands is inscribed with the Latin phrase "E Pluribus Unum." Third, the statue is imbued with deep symbolic value because of President Abraham Lincoln's insistence that the figure be placed on the Capitol Dome in 1863 to commemorate the eventual reunification of the Union. Thus, all of these factors together make the statue a fitting symbol for the concept of citizenship.

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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

Warm regards from the campus of Northwestern Oklahoma State University in Alva, and welcome to the 2014 edition of *Civitas: The Journal of Citizenship Studies*.

Several individuals and groups deserve appreciation for their continuing support of Institute and Departmental activities this past year, including the NWOSU Senior Administration, the NWOSU Foundation, and the Masonic Charity Foundation of Oklahoma. Additionally, we wish to recognize the professional assistance provided by Alica Hall and her staff at the NWOSU Printing Services, as well as Brandice Guerra, Assistant Professor of Art at Humboldt State University in Arcata, California, who designed the journal's striking cover. Moreover, we remain grateful to NWOSU Webmaster, Jake Boedecker, for helping us maintain and update the Institute's expanding Webpages. Not least of all, we observe as always the many behind the scenes contributions of the journal's editorial review board members.

At this time of publication, we also wish to acknowledge that Governor George Nigh is stepping down this spring after several years of serving on our editorial review board. We express our gratitude to him for his longtime support.

We are breaking some new academic ground in this, our third annual volume. In particular, we are excited to showcase for the first time a number of student contributions from both NWOSU and outside academic institutions. In addition, departing somewhat from the previous two years' greater local and regional focus, the 2014 edition covers an even wider range of citizenship-related topics ranging from issues in Oklahoma and Washington, DC, to distant parts of the former Soviet Union.

David J. Trimbach opens the volume with the detailed article, "Scales of Estonian Citizenship: Implications for Russophone Political Incorporation." His thorough investigation into citizenship and nationality issues in the former Soviet republic of Estonia represents a timely topic in view of recent events transpiring between Russia and its regional neighbors. Trimbach is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Geography at the University of Kansas in Lawrence, where he is pursuing research on citizenship geography, Baltic area studies, Russian-speaking minorities, minority political incorporation, critical geopolitics and social theory.

Institute member Dr. J. Otto Pohl is Lecturer in the Department of History at the University of Ghana (Legon). His piece, "Kyrgyz National Identity," treats the former Soviet republic of Kyrgyzstan, where he argues that the former Soviet Union (1917-1991) set into motion a complicated series of developments that led to the formation of modern national identification of different Central Asian peoples.

Halfway across the globe, in the heart of North America, modern nation-state building took place during the nineteenth century within another northern hemispheric power called the United States. Ken LaFon's perceptive essay, "The Linguistic Legacy of the Louisiana Purchase,"

examines the geographical, cultural, and linguistic significance of the 1803 Louisiana Purchase. LaFon completed his master's degree in education a couple of years ago at NWOSU and is now seeking his terminal degree at Oklahoma State University in Stillwater.

Another Institute member, Dr. Richmond B. Adams, an Assistant Professor of English at NWOSU, tackles through literary analysis sensitive matters of race, citizenship and identity in the American South following the U.S. Civil War in his article, "Of Course, Mr. Kennedy Is in the Clan, and Ashley, Too. They Are Men, Aren't They?": Citizens, Codes and the Post-Bellum South."

Next, we are proud to highlight a number of our current or recent NWOSU students who are contributing research to the journal. NWOSU American Studies graduate student, Sarah M. Hardaway, writes on the fascinating historical development and contemporary relevance of the filibuster in the United States Senate, while NWOSU history graduate, Ryan Brandt, provides a thoughtful overview of the many considerations behind Oklahoma's tax policy. U.S. Air Force veteran Tim Legg is completing his undergraduate studies at NWOSU, and in this volume he reflects on citizenship engagement and the need for ethical and responsible individual citizens to maintain the integrity and health of the American electoral and political process.

The volume concludes with two short book reviews connected with literature and the Oklahoma experience. Ken LaFon highlights Shawn Holliday's *The Oklahoma Poets Laureate: A Sourcebook, History, and Anthology*, while Eric J. Schmaltz provides an overview of Gary Reiswig's *Land Rush: Stories from the Great Plains*.

Though already anticipating next year's volume, we pause here to thank all our article contributors for turning out yet another quality publication. We also highly encourage students, amateur and professional scholars, and others to submit their research findings and reviews for future consideration in *Civitas*.

For the public record, in addition to posting the digital versions online, we are placing multiple hard copies of each *Civitas* edition at the NWOSU Library in Alva, the Alva Public Library, and the Oklahoma Historical Society (OHS) in Oklahoma City.

Dr. Aaron L. Mason and Dr. Eric J. Schmaltz
Senior Editors, Civitas: Journal of Citizenship Studies

SCALES OF ESTONIAN CITIZENSHIP: IMPLICATIONS FOR RUSSOPHONE POLITICAL INCORPORATION

DAVID J. TRIMBACH

University of Kansas in Lawrence



Abstract

Estonian citizenship is well documented in Baltic regional studies and citizenship scholarship. This scholarship can be strengthened by considering spatial aspects of citizenship. This article connects citizenship to space by recognizing the spatial scales of citizenship. Through scales, citizenship acquisition and political participation policies in Estonia, as well as their implications on Russophone political incorporation and mobilization, receive analysis. The relationship among naturalization and electoral policies with political mobilization via jurisdictional scale is examined. This article finds that the multi-scalar muddling of Estonian citizenship, through the scalar expansion of citizenship, structurally hinders Russophone political incorporation and mobilization, while it simultaneously creates potential new sites for engagement.

Keywords: Estonia; citizenship; Russian-speaking minorities; political geography; scale.

Introduction: Scales of Estonian Citizenship and Russophone Political Incorporation

The legal restoration of the Republic of Estonia and sequential national citizenship policy provides a unique socio-spatial case study. Estonian citizenship in relation to the minority Russophone population provides an opportunity to address how the scale and inherent spatiality of citizenship influences political incorporation and mobilization opportunities. Estonian Russophone citizenship dilemma is well documented in Baltic studies and citizenship studies research (Evans 1998; Khrychikov and Miall 2002; Kallas 2008); however, this article bridges the conceptual gaps of previous research by considering the spatial and scalar aspects of citizenship.

This paper is not intended to be a comprehensive critique of Estonian citizenship and political institutions per se; rather it is a fresh descriptive spatial reinterpretation of Estonian citizenship. This analysis also provides additional implications for Russophone political incorporation. By addressing the spatiality of Estonian citizenship and its current socio-spatial structure, this analysis aims to address Estonian citizenship and Russophone integration.

The following is an overall summation of the structure of this paper. Firstly, this study conceptually teases out citizenship, scale, political incorporation, and Russophone. Secondly, it provide the supporting methodology for this geographic analysis. Thirdly, it looks at the development of contemporary Estonian citizenship and political participation policies in relation to the Russophone population. Lastly, it provides an analysis of Estonian citizenship in relation to the Russophone population by scale, subsequent conclusion and implications for Russophone political incorporation.

Literature Review: Citizenship and Scale

Citizenship is fraught with conceptual and contextual contestation. This analysis seeks to assist in answering the question, “Where’s citizenship?,” (Staeheli 2010) within political geography and to incorporate scale into the broader Estonian citizenship discourse. Neoliberal globalization and Westphalian nation-state decline has called into question the conceptual relevance of nation-state centered citizenship (Sassen 2002; Ong 2006); however, citizenship is what connects the nation to the state, and this relationship has gone through a process of “reconfiguration and relocation” rather than complete relational dissipation (Staeheli 1999, 60). Kofman (1995, 133) notes that since the 1990s there has been a “new geometry” of citizenship, particularly within the greater European community.

Citizenship is a complex concept that contains two enmeshed aspects (Staeheli 1999). The first aspect is formal citizenship. Formal citizenship refers to a legal category defined by the nation-state (Blank 2007; Staeheli 1999). Formal citizenship entails a set of bundled legal entitlements. Examples of entitlements include welfare, political participation (voting, political party membership, electioneering, and running for office), protest, residency, religion, marriage, education, press, and free speech. Entitlements are expected to expedite related legal responsibilities. Examples of legal responsibilities include taxes, military service, and jury duty. Formal rights and responsibilities vary from nation to nation.

The second aspect is substantive citizenship. Substantive citizenship entails the ability of a citizen to act and be recognized and respected as a citizen both by others and the nation-state (Staeheli 1999). Substantive citizenship is not limited to formal legalities. According to Staeheli (1999, 64), substantive citizenship differs from formal in that, “it is shaped by the material and ideological conditions in a society that enable people to function with some degree of autonomy, to formulate political ideas, and to act on those ideas.” Citizens or residents within a territory may possess formal citizenship but not substantive if they are unable to utilize their citizenship within the public sphere and vice versa (Valentine and Skelton 2007).

Citizenship is inclusive and simultaneously exclusive. It is a form of legal stratification and as a consequence leads to varied degrees of civic, political, economic, and socio-cultural inequality. Dominant models of citizenship (liberal and republican) in theory are based on the universality of entitlements and responsibilities of political agents (Staeheli 1999). The political reality of citizenship is that it is extended and denied based on social groups (Staeheli 1999; Kofman 2002; Yiftachel and Ghanem 2004; Jackson 2007). Some groups dominate the political citizenry and are able to exercise freely their citizenship, while other groups struggle to obtain citizenship. This analysis focuses on Estonian citizenship with the inherent notion of citizenship consisting of enmeshed formal and substantive aspects. It brings to the fore how Estonian citizenship policies

are differentiated by scale and consequently provide differentiated engagement opportunities for Russophones.

The particular engagement opportunities allotted by citizenship of interest here are political incorporation and naturalization. Political incorporation has two defining terms, political and incorporation (Bloemraad 2006a). Political refers to the acquisition of citizenship through naturalization, community advocacy through collective mobilization, and electoral participation (Bloemraad 2006a, 5). The term incorporation refers to the process of becoming an active participant in mainstream political debates, practices, and decision-making processes (Bloemraad 2006a, 5). The four types of political incorporation analyzed in the following sections are electoral participation, political party development, political engagement, and naturalization.

Citizenship is constructed and experienced spatially through a multiplicity of scales (Kofman 1995; Staeheli 1999; Blank 2007). Citizenship is legally linked to jurisdictional scales. According to Blank (2007, 421), “three meaningful territorial spheres currently structure the various aspects of what is understood to be citizenship,” which are sub-national, national, and supra-national. Blank (2007, 421) addresses three distinct legal interconnected “spheres” or scales of citizenship based on territories (localities, states, and world). Territorially embedded legal structures thus territorially embed citizenship into places at various scales (Staeheli 1999; Blank 2007).

Formal citizenship is legally constructed and performed at various scales of governmental jurisdictions. Thus formal citizenship can differ depending on the jurisdictional scale. A citizen or resident of a nation-state can have differing entitlements at sub-national (local), national, and supra-national scales. For example, a legal resident within a nation-state may not have the right to vote in national elections, but may have the right to vote in local elections. Substantive citizenship is performed at various scales. A legal resident may be recognized as an individual with distinct rights at a supra-national level (by an international human rights organization or the United Nations perhaps), but at the same time may not be recognized at a local level. Citizenship and citizenship access is differentiated by scale (Staeheli 1999; Blank 2007). Furthermore, marginalized groups struggle to access citizenship through scale or jumping scales in order to achieve full citizenship (Cox 1998). Scales are interconnected, thus struggles for citizenship acquisition at one scale also has a direct impact on citizenship at other scales (Blank 2007). By recognizing the spatiality of citizenship, this analysis connects Estonian citizenship policies to three overlapping and simultaneous jurisdictional scales. The three scales are: supra-national defined as the European Union (EU); national defined as the Estonian nation-state; and sub-national defined as local-regional within Estonia.

This spatial reinterpretation of Estonian citizenship focuses on the Russophone population. Russophone in this context refers to the Russian-speaking population consisting primarily of ethnic Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian Soviet-era migrants and their descendants (Laitin 1998). Russophone is an encompassing term that highlights the increase in Russian-speaking population as a specific identifying moniker for former Soviet citizens residing outside of the Russian Federation (Laitin 1998). The following sections illustrate how jurisdictional scales affect the Russophone population’s citizenship as exemplified by political incorporation and mobilization while they simultaneously create potential new sites for engagement.

Methodology

This project bridges conceptual and disciplinary gaps by connecting citizenship to political geography and recognizing the overlapping spatial scales of citizenship. The bulwark of the data accumulated for this analysis comes from secondary available literature, available statistics, qualitative research, and theoretical analyses. Available literature and archival data include previous research from an interdisciplinary research collection, government documents, and various non-governmental organization reports.

Available literature includes a plethora of interdisciplinary analyses. Most available literature comes from what could be described as the emergent fields of Baltic area studies and citizenship studies. Government resources include: Estonian Parliament (*Riigikogu*), Estonian Police and Border Guard Board (*Politsei-ja Piirivalveamet*) (established in 2011 following the consolidation of Police Board, Central Criminal Police, Personal Protection and Law Enforcement Police, Border Guard Board, Aviation Group of Border Guard, and Citizenship and Migration Board), and European Parliament. This study intends to utilize Statistics Estonia for this analysis; however, it was not used because of statistical discrepancies between naturalization records of the Estonian Police and Border Guard Board and Statistics Estonia. Non-governmental organizations include the Legal Information Center for Human Rights, Transatlantic Council on Migration, Migration Policy Institute (MIPEX), and Institute of Baltic Studies. The majority of available literature and data focus primarily on the issues of citizenship, political incorporation, political institutions, and Estonian Russophones at various scales.

Background: Estonia's Restoration and Estonian Citizenship

Unlike other constituent Soviet Republics, the Republic of Estonia pursued independence as a restoration of nationhood rather than secession from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) (Kaplan 1993; Feldman 2010). The Republic of Estonia peacefully restored independence in 1991 after fifty years of Soviet occupation. Understanding the specificities of the independence path taken by Estonia through the legal philosophy of restorationism is crucial to grasp Estonian citizenship and political participation policies. Restorationism set in motion a specific set of legal and jurisdictional processes that splintered the Estonian population into hegemonic titular ethnic Estonians and marginalized non-titular Russophones (Gelazis 2004; Feldman 2005).

The Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic's (ESSR) population dramatically shifted during its brief nationhood. In 1939, ethnic Estonians were estimated to be 92 percent of the population while the remainder of the population primarily consisted of a mix of Germans, Swedes, Jews, Setos, Latvians, Poles, and Russians (Kaplan 1993). Ethnic Estonians declined dramatically within the ESSR especially during the first two decades of Soviet occupation. Estonian decline was largely the consequence of forced emigration, deportation, execution, and war-related fatalities (Feldman 2005). Rapid industrialization and urbanization dictated from Moscow sparked an influx of Russophones. The Soviet government incentivized Russophone labor migration to Estonia particularly within the industrial sector in the northeastern region. This industry attracted around 500,000 Russophones to the ESSR (Feldman 2010). By 1989, the proportion of ethnic Estonians declined to 61.5 percent and Russophone population increased to an estimated 30-35 percent (Raun 2009).

The restoration of the Estonian nation-state revealed two parallel yet distinct societies with divergent historical narratives and immense socio-cultural incongruity. The Russophone population, although a heterogeneous community (Laitin 1998), was perceived as a threat to national stability and Estonian cultural preeminence by the burgeoning Estonian nation-state (Khrychikov and Miall 2002).

The philosophy of restorationism in 1991 built the legal foundations of Estonian citizenship. In order to understand this philosophy, it is crucial to provide appropriate historical context in relation to the embeddedness of restorationism in Estonian political institutions. During and immediately following independence, two rival Estonian nationalist political movements, the Estonian Popular Front (EPF) and Estonian Citizens Committees (ECCs), struggled to gain hegemonic influence (Pettai and Hallik 2002). Although both sought independence from the USSR, they had competing strategies, policies, and political narratives, especially concerning the larger Russophone community.

The Estonian Popular Front led by Edgar Savisaar focused on an inclusive policy approach towards the Russophone population, and it seemed like an actuality with the EPF electoral victory in 1991. This inclusivity was exemplified by the inclusive independence referendum in which over 1,144,309 Soviet citizens participated (Russophones and Estonians) (Järve and Poleshchuk 2010) and by the Savisaar government's proposal to grant Estonian citizenship based on residence in 1990. If enacted, all residents in Estonia would obtain citizenship upon independence (Khrychikov and Miall 2002).

The heavily nationalist ECCs developed and perpetuated an ideology of legal restorationism, linking the Russophone population to illegal occupation and immigration (Pettai and Hallik 2002). The ECCs asserted that the Estonian nation-state was illegally annexed by the Soviet Union, thus all Soviet institutions and Soviet citizenship were illegitimate. Under restorationist logic, legitimate power rested with the original pre-Soviet citizens and their descendants. This ideology spurred on a widely popular grassroots campaign to register all pre-Soviet republic citizens in order to reconstitute a legal and legitimate citizenry (in opposition to the larger Soviet citizenry). By 1989, the ECCs registered around 600,000 citizens (Pettai and Hallik 2002).

Both political movements struggled for power and legitimacy during the waning months of the USSR. In 1991, the ECCs held an election for an independent Estonian Congress with over 500,000 registered citizens participating. Weeks later the EPF was victorious in securing a majority in the Estonian Supreme Soviet. For that brief period, Estonia simultaneously had two competing legislatures under the control of two competing political movements with some representative overlap. Both legislative bodies simultaneously sought independence from the USSR. The ECCs representatives in the Supreme Council were eventually successful in securing restorationism as the official ideology of independence for Estonia.

Although the ECCs representatives were successful in securing restorationism as the official ideology within the Supreme Council, the majority of power was in the hands of the EPF. The EPF could have passed its inclusive citizenship policies with only minor confrontation from the ECCs. However, the attempted communist coup in Moscow in August 1991 and sudden collapse of Soviet authority triggered an increase in ECCs popularity, dashing all prospects for inter-ethnic

collaboration and inclusive citizenship. Within days after the attempted coup the ECCs and EFP jointly declared the “continuity of the Republic of Estonia as subject of international law” and “the restoration of diplomatic relations” with the international community (Pettai and Hallik 2002, 512). In addition, a new Constitutional Assembly was established. International law guarantees automatic citizenship to all residents of secessionist states (Feldman 2008). However, this path was not taken by the burgeoning Estonian government.

In November 1991, the new governing body officially restored the Citizenship Law of 1938, awarding citizenship only to citizenship holders of 1940 and their descendants (Feldman 2010). Ethnic Estonians overwhelmingly made up the new citizenry, while around 75,000 Russophones received citizenship on this basis (Feldman 2005). This decision instantaneously created an electorally stateless population of 500,000 Russophones. Regardless if Russophones could be legally classified *jus soli* (birth in the territory) or *jus domicili* (principle of residence), the Estonian restorationist citizenship regime was codified as *jus sanguinis* (descent from a citizen parent or “blood relationship”) (<http://estonia.eu/about-estonia/society/citizenship.html>, accessed 9/7/2011).

Henceforth, Estonian citizenship was dominated by the legal concept of *jus sanguinis* and naturalization. After the restoration of Estonian citizenship, Russophones were categorized as illegal immigrants and given the following options: apply for legal Estonian residency (permanent or temporary), Estonian citizenship, Russian citizenship, or remain stateless.

Citizenship, naturalization, and political participation policies in relation to the Russophone population have evolved since the restoration of the 1938 Estonian citizenship law. The 1992 Constitution of Estonia proclaims that it guarantees “the preservation of the Estonian nation and its culture throughout the ages,” with no mention of ethnic minorities or ethnic rights (Riigikogu 1992). It also states that the “supreme power of state” is vested solely in “the people” which in this case refers to citizens (Riigikogu 1992). Restorationist logic became codified in the supreme law of Estonia. In 1993, the Estonian Parliament (*Riigikogu*) enacted a law for the Cultural Autonomy of National Minorities and the Law on Aliens (Gelazis 2004; Yiftachel and Ghanem 2004). These laws prioritized rights and related socio-cultural and political benefits for citizens only. In 1995, the Citizenship Act was passed by the Estonian Parliament. The Estonian Citizenship Act in its current form (note that it has been amended) states that Estonian citizenship is:

1. Acquired by birth;
2. Acquired by naturalization;
3. Resumed by a person who lost Estonian citizenship as a minor;
4. Lost through the release from or deprivation of Estonian citizenship under the conditions and pursuant to the procedure provided for this Act (Riigikogu 1995).

The Citizenship Act of 1995 (in addition to the Constitution) also states the conditions for acquisition of Estonian citizenship by naturalization and requirements for political participation. The naturalization process includes residency requirements, a language proficiency exam, stable income, and an Estonian constitutional competency exam. Non-citizens are barred from political party membership, voting in national elections or holding national office (Berg 2001). Non-

citizens are permitted to vote and participate in local elections; however, non-citizens are not able to hold mayorship (Yiftachel and Ghanem 2004).

Like the Citizenship Law of 1938 (officially reapplied in 1992), the Citizenship Act of 1995 was fraught with contention and controversy, both domestic and international. During the 1990s, the Estonian government sparred with Russophone community organizations (particularly in northeastern Estonia where Russian-speakers are heavily concentrated), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the EU, the Russian Federation, and various human rights organizations. Although these antagonistic entities differed in discourse and political slant, all were in considerable agreement that the citizenship laws were ethnically biased and presented an immense potential for political instability in a new post-communist world.

The Citizenship Act and Constitution have been amended since their initial enactment because of domestic and international pressures concerning the minority Russophone population; however, the Estonian government has remained steadfast in maintaining its restorationist legal logic over all legal matters related to ethnic or linguistic affairs. Minor successes were made that eased naturalization requirements but were largely related to citizenship acquisition of disabled persons, stateless children, and the elderly. The conditional accession process to the EU triggered essential mandates for the Estonian government including the introduction of a national minority and stateless integration program (Feldman 2010; Järve and Poleshcuk 2010). Another piece of related legislation was Local Government Council Election Act of 2002 (later amended in 2003 and 2004) that provides legal standards for local elections and non-citizen participation rules. Estonia successfully joined the EU in 2004.

The accession to the EU was a major milestone for the Estonian government and post-Soviet world. Because of EU membership, all citizens within Estonia are also official EU citizens. Some pertinent major benefits of EU citizenship are freedom of movement between EU members and political participation within the broader European Parliament (Gelazis 2004). Since accession, the international community has largely remained silent on citizenship and Russophone issues, with the exceptions of the Russian Federation, human rights organizations, and during the Bronze Soldier incident of 2007 (Järve and Poleshcuk 2010). The Bronze Soldier incident of 2007 refers to the government mandated relocation of a Soviet monument that triggered Russophone riots in Tallinn. As noted, "Estonia interpreted the admission to the EU as the ultimate international approval of its citizenship policies" (Järve and Poleshcuk 2010, 13). With the exception of the recent citizenship deprivation laws and "Bronze nights' laws" that relate to relinquishing citizenship from individuals who act against the Estonian nation-state, no significant changes have been made since (Feldman 2010).

Analysis

National Scale

Citizenship is most evident at the national scale. Territorial fetishization of the nation-state dominates citizenship research and geographic understandings of political processes. The nation-state is the key scale where citizenship policies are produced and implemented. Furthermore, Estonian citizenship research has primarily focused on the national scale (Evans 1998; Berg 2001; Kuus 2002; Pettai and Hallik 2002; Lühiste 2006; Solska 2011). As the Estonian

nation-state developed during the early 1990s, an exclusionary legal framework was established that continues to hinder Russophone political incorporation at all scales. Thus it is important to look first at the national scale of citizenship, since it is the major center of citizenship policy genesis.

Formal citizenship is acquired at the national scale. Russophones must navigate a complicated legal trajectory to reach naturalization (for example, see aforementioned naturalization requirements). The Estonian government has implemented numerous integration and naturalization programs aimed at increasing naturalization both at the national and local scales. Estonian integration programs are politically volatile, subject to Estonian nationalist manipulation, and the Russophone community is largely marginalized at program development and implementation stages (Feldman 2005, 2008). Estonian formal citizenship acquisition is highly exclusionary, linguistically strict, and increases institutional minority marginalization (Kuus 2002; Pettai and Hallik 2002; Lühiste 2006; Crowther and Matonyte 2007; Kovalenko, et. al. 2010; MIPEX 2011). Structural minority marginalization can lead to political instability and even violence.

During the 1990s, the total share of citizens in Estonia was only around 66 percent and has since increased to around 80 percent of the population (Lühiste 2006). Most Russophones either opted to become Estonian citizens, citizens of the Russian Federation, or apply for temporary or permanent residency permits. Naturalization statistics provided by the Estonian Police and Border Guard Board indicate that between 1992 and 2011, 152,989 individuals were naturalized (<http://www.politsei.ee/dotAsset/61217.pdf>, accessed 10/4/2011). Naturalization data based on nationality between 1992 and 1999 are not available; however, naturalization data based on nationality are available between 2000 and 2011 to help convey the overall naturalization of Russophones. To indicate Russophones based on the Police and Board Guard Board's categories, this study lumps the following populations together: stateless (no nationality), Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian. This is done for two reasons. First, the connection between statelessness and Russian-speakers in Estonia is well-documented. Second, Slavic populations are known to reside in the same segregated communities and interact within the public sphere in the Russian language. Between 2000 and 2011, 42,580 Russophones acquired formal citizenship (<http://www.politsei.ee/dotAsset/61217.pdf>, accessed 10/4/2011). Russophones were 99 percent of all naturalization cases to occur during that time. It can be assumed that Russophones made up the vast majority of naturalization cases prior to 2000 as well.

Lühiste (2006) predicted that Russophone naturalization would continue to progress over the coming years; however, since 2007, there has been a marked decline in naturalization (see Table 1). Whether the marked decline is directly connected to the Bronze Soldier riots of 2007 and political aftermath is left to interpretation. However, Järve and Poleschuk (2010) note that following the Bronze Soldier riots, the Russian Embassy in Tallinn recorded a substantial increase in applications for Russian citizenship. Russophones are lured by visa-free travel and employment opportunities in both the Schengen area and Russian Federation (Järve and Poleschuk 2010).

Previously Held Citizenship/Year	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Stateless Persons (no citizenship)	6635	4367	3934	1961	1556	1080	703
Russian Federation	412	355	267	138	87	74	73
Ukraine	3	15	19	16	20	17	4
Belarus	7	5	1	3	1	2	1
Total	7057	4742	4221	2118	1664	1173	781

Table 1. Naturalization by Previously Held Citizenship
(<http://www.politsei.ee/dotAsset/16127.pdf>, accessed 10/4/2011)

In order to give more background to the 152,989 naturalization cases, one must also look at the number of individuals who are still labeled as temporary and permanent residents. As of July 2011, Estonia holds 205,481 temporary and permanent residents, with 48 percent of those categorized as stateless (99,417) and 47 percent as citizens of the Russian Federation (98,663) (see Table 2) (<http://www.politsei.ee/dotAsset/61217.pdf>, accessed 10/4/2011). Russophone temporary and permanent residents currently make up around 15 percent of the total Estonian population (<http://www.politsei.ee/dotAsset/61217.pdf>, accessed 10/4/2011; <http://estonia.eu/about-estonia/society/citizenship.html>, accessed 10/4/2011).

Successful completion of a formal citizenship examination is one significant route to formal naturalization. Between 1992 and 2005, 58,016 (out of a total of 138,246) individuals (primarily Russophones) obtained citizenship through formal examination or around 42 percent (Järve and Poleschuk 2010) while the rest obtained citizenship through other legal mechanisms. Although a significant portion of the Russophone population obtained citizenship through formal examination, the examination is often criticized as excessively difficult because of high language proficiency requirements and is perceived largely as a barrier by Russophones to citizenship acquisition (Laitin 1998; Järve and Poleschuk 2010; MIPEX 2011).

Formal citizenship access through naturalization at the national scale shows mixed results for the Estonian nation-state. Although some Russophones have been naturalized, more are inclined to maintain temporary or permanent residency status. This trend suggests the development of more inclusive integration programs and inclusive formal citizenship policies such as a scaling down of language requirements connected to the citizenship examination. Formal citizenship is primarily determined at the national scale, thus politically active Russophones have only so many means to access or struggle for citizenship through political process. Russophones may struggle for access through the national parliament and electoral politics.

Current Citizenship/ Residency Status	Temporary Residency	Permanent Residency	Total	Percentage
Stateless Persons (no citizenship)	11,119	88,298	99,417	48%
Russian Federation	8375	90,288	98,663	47%
Ukraine	1707	4008	5715	3%
Belarus	361	1325	1686	1%
Total	21,562	183,919	205,481	99%

Table 2. Estonian Residency Status by Current Citizenship (7/1/2011)

(<http://www.politsei.ee/dotAsset/16127.pdf>, accessed 10/4/2011)

The restoration of pre-Soviet citizenship structurally deferred Russophone electoral and political participation at all scales. The restoration of the 1938 Citizenship Law and immediate subsequent legislation mandated a two-year residency and an additional one-year waiting period for non-citizens to start the naturalization process. Newly stateless Russophones not only had to wait three years in order to start the naturalization process, but were also barred for three years from electoral processes, political party development, and political engagement (Berg 2001; Gelazis 2004). Legally, Russophones were unable to access all aspects of citizenship at this time. Russophones were essentially in a state of political deferment or legal limbo, awaiting their turn to participate in an independent Estonia. In addition, strict civil service Estonian language and citizenship requirements were established, restricting Russophones from entering the public sector, further hindering the development of Russophone political elites at the national scale (Kallas 2008).

This political deferment established a set of political and legal mechanisms that continue to hinder Russophone political incorporation at all scales. Russophones could not participate in early Estonian elections or establish political parties. Since political party funding is based on electoral success (5 percent threshold), Russophone political parties waited until they were able to participate in order to gain access to parliament and party funding (Sikk 2006). The ethnic Estonian-dominated parliament set new citizenship and political participation laws without Russophone input. The political deferment overall has retarded Russophone political incorporation and political party development.

Russophone political parties have been largely ineffective at the national scale, with some minor successes. Only Estonian citizens can establish recognized political parties or political organizations in Estonia. Public funding for political organizations is also restricted to those run by citizens. Non-citizens are also barred from voting in national elections or running for national political office. Russophone political party successes are more prevalent at the local scale, yet there have been some minor successes on the national level. Since independence, the number of non-Estonian ethnic minorities holding national political office has been around six (out of 100) (Kallas 2008, 5). During the 1995 and 1999 parliamentary elections, Russophone parties won six seats (all Our Home is Estonia Party) in the former and four (all United People's Party of Estonia) in the latter. Although Russophone political parties exist at the national level, most Russophones prefer and are elected through mainstream parties, as noted above with some exceptions (Kallas

2008). Since the 1999 election, all elected Russian-speaking members in parliament have been members of mainstream parties. Most have been members of the Center Party, while a small minority comes from the Reform Party (Kallas 2008). During the 1999 parliamentary elections, the Center Party voiced its inclusiveness of Russophones and a Russophone minority platform. The Center Party led by former Prime Minister and current Tallinn mayor Edgar Savisaar pursues an inclusive minority integration policy, lenient citizenship policy, and a foreign policy based on improving relations with the Russian Federation. The 2003 parliamentary election was a major disaster for Russophone parties at the national level (Pettai 2004). The two main parties, the United People's Party and Russian Party of Estonia, did not even attempt to form a single candidate list for elections because of internal personality conflicts. This disaster is perceived as turning point in Russophone incorporation into the political mainstream, with most Russophones backing mainstream parties (Pettai 2004). The riots associated with the Bronze Soldier monument relocation have only been perceived to increase mainstream party affiliation and voter preferences (Kallas 2008; Solvak and Pettai 2008).

At the national scale, Russophone formal citizenship has increased with Russophones consisting of around 15 percent of the total national electorate (Kallas 2008). Currently, naturalization is on the decline with many Russophones feeling disaffected with national politics, preferring temporary or permanent immigration status to full formal citizenship (Berg 2001; Kallas 2008; Kõsto 2011). Temporary and permanent residents still overwhelmingly outnumber Russophone citizens. Political underrepresentation continues to be problematic for both formal and substantive citizenship access. Russophones struggle most to access citizenship at the national scale. Furthermore, a weak national-linguistic identity, lack of minority inclusive integration policy development, and structurally hindering electoral institutions have led to the overall co-optation of a potential Russophone voting block into mainstream political parties.

Sub-national Scale

The sub-national consists of distinct sub-national jurisdictional entities or governments. Estonia is administratively divided up into 15 counties (*Maakonnad*) that are further subdivided into municipalities (rural and urban). The majority of Russophones resides in Ida-Viru and Harju Counties. Estonian Russophones are predominantly urban dwellers, and the counties of Ida-Viru and Harju coincidentally contain Estonia's largest and third largest cities (Tallinn and Narva). Ida-Viru County also hosts Estonia's oil shale and chemical industries that once employed Soviet Russophone laborers. The sub-national scale exemplified by municipalities provides Russophones "an opportunity structure not only to mobilize their localities into collective action but also to challenge the center" (Smith and Wilson 1997, 851). As Staeheli (1999, 64) notes, "citizenship may be experienced most at the local level." For groups denied access to formal citizenship, the sub-national scale is where substantive citizenship is most important. Citizenship at the national scale directly influences Russophone citizenship at the sub-national scale, since national laws are implemented at the sub-national level. Russophone identity and substantive citizenship is most closely connected to the local scale (Raun 2009), where there have been incidences of electoral successes and collective political action targeted against political disenfranchisement.

No nationally sustained Russophone political elite exist in Estonia (Smith and Wilson 1997; Khrychikov and Miall 2002). At the sub-national scale, a small, highly fractionalized Russophone

political elite do exist; however, these elites are more likely to be connected to economic development and private sector than political affairs (Smith and Wilson 1997). Although strict civil service language and citizenship requirements in Estonia restrict public employment opportunities to Estonian-speaking citizens, local exceptions have been made for regions with high proportions of minority representation (Kallas 2008). The local elite have created various organizations, which have further splintered the local community along political platforms, based on either moderate or radical ethnic politics. The political elite in Ida-Viru County “lacks the leadership skills, including linguistic tools, and access to either the Estonian or Western media to secure a more sympathetic audience both inside and outside Estonia,” and to gain a substantial political voice within its own splintered community (Smith and Wilson 1997, 858).

Estonia, like sixteen other European countries, has local voting laws that allow non-citizens to participate in municipal or regional politics (Groenendijk 2008). Russophones had high levels of electoral participation during the 1990s. However, like Estonian voter turnout overall, there has been a significant voter turnout decline (Kallas 2008). The Russophone population has had significant electoral successes in Ida-Viru County municipalities and Tallinn City Council elections (Chinn and Treux 1996; Smith and Wilson 1997; Khrychikov and Miall 2002). Local voter turnout peaked in 1998, with an 85 percent non-citizen voter turnout and has since decreased (Kallas 2008). Yet, compared to ethnic Estonian representation, ethnic inclusiveness of political institutions at all scales “is most problematic in Estonia” (Crowther and Matonyte 2007, 297).

Like their Estonian counterparts, many Russophone political parties have emerged, merged, and collapsed since the early 1990s. To exist as a legal political party in Estonia, a party requires 1,000 registered members in addition to paying a monetary fee (Auers and Kasekamp 2009). The 1,000-member threshold has proved a major obstacle for many political parties both Russian and Estonian. Two Russian nationalist parties, the Russian National Unity Party and the National Bolshevik Party have formed yet are not legally registered. Official parties claiming to represent the Russophone population at both local and national scales are the Russian Party of Estonia, Russian Unity Party, Constitution Party, United People’s Party, and Social Democratic Labor Party. During the 1999 elections, the latter three parties merged into the United People’s Party of Estonia (UPPE) (Fritsmaurice 2001; Auers and Kasekam, 2009). Because of the Estonian electoral threshold of 5 percent in order to gain seats at local and national administrative bodies, the single transferable vote system and an electoral success-based party funding structure, Russophone party successes continue to be limited to the local level (Khrychikov and Miall 2002; Sikk 2006).

Russophone party membership, like ethnic Estonian party membership, is low, and the voter preference leans towards mainstream parties. The mainstream Estonian Center Party led by Edgar Savisaar is the most widely preferred political party among Russophones (Auers and Kasekamp 2009). The Estonian Center Party is the only mainstream political party whose political platform is inclusive of Russophones, forms coalitions with Russophone parties (and political organizations), and claims to support national Russophone interests. Electoral coalitions between the Center Party and Russophone political parties have produced successful ruling coalitions, particularly in Tallinn and numerous municipalities in Ida-Viru County. In 2005, 24 out of 63 (38%) elected members to the Tallinn City Council were non-Estonian, while in municipalities

where higher concentrations of Russophones are found, the representation is even more proportionate (Kallas 2008).

The sub-national level is also the primary site for local political participation aimed against political institutions and national policies. Numerous documented incidents of local political mobilization aimed at particular national policies have arisen (Smith and Wilson 1997; Evans 1998; Khrychikov and Miall 2002; Solska 2011). The sub-national scale is the main arena for Russophone political struggle and engagement. The early 1990s saw an unsuccessful territorial autonomy campaign in Ida-Viru County. The autonomy campaign was a direct consequence of the restoration of citizenship of only pre-Soviet citizens and the strict naturalization guidelines for non-citizens. Many Russophones perceived these laws as discriminatory measures aimed ultimately at total Russophone expulsion from Estonia, and thus many sought regional ethnic autonomy as a political response. The campaign was very successful at the sub-national level, with high levels of participation and an overall preference from territorial autonomy. In the end, the referendum results were proclaimed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Estonia.

The largest and most violent post-independence incident was the Bronze Soldier riots in 2007. As a consequence of relocating a Bronze Soldier Soviet monument from the center of Tallinn to a peripheral military cemetery, widespread political mobilization occurred within the Russophone population. Mostly consisting of Russophone youths, unprecedented riots and police clashes occurred for two consecutive nights in Tallinn, leaving one participant dead and 1,200 arrested (Auers and Kasekamp 2009; Järve and Poleschuk 2010). These two incidents underscore the significance of the local scale as a site for Russophone political incorporation and engagement.

Supra-national Scale

Legal and socio-political conditions at Estonian sub-national and national citizenship scales have a reciprocal legal relationship with the EU supra-national scale. All national and sub-national citizenship laws directly impact a Russophone's ability to acquire citizenship at the supra-national level. EU citizenship and political participation is determined by Estonian citizenship status (Gelazis 2004). Only a small portion of Russophones have acquired supra-national citizenship based on this prerequisite, while the vast majority of Russophones is unable to enjoy the same benefits. EU citizenship provides the ability to migrate freely and work throughout the greater EU. That benefit could potentially create a demand for Estonian citizenship acquisition (Gelazis 2004), but that has yet to be determined. Freer movement of ethnic Estonians to nation-states with higher incomes could create a greater income imbalance between Estonians and Russophones with the potential for unrest.

During the 1990s, the EU was able to influence citizenship policies at the national and sub-national scales in Estonia (Feldman 2010; Solska 2011). As a conditionality of EU accession, the Estonian government implemented integration policies with the aim of increasing naturalization of Russophones and stateless persons. With EU financial assistance, the Estonian government founded the Integration Foundation, a non-governmental organization aimed at Russophone integration and naturalization. The EU also assisted in enforcing minor reforms on Estonian citizenship policies. These reforms largely focused on easing citizenship restrictions on minors, the elderly, and disabled persons. Since EU accession, no major inclusive reforms have been made to citizenship legislation.

Estonia holds six seats in the European Parliament. Estonian Russophones have never been electorally represented since EU accession in 2004 (<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/members/public/geoSearch/search.do?country=EE&language=EN>, accessed 10/4/2011). The European Parliament has primarily been dominated by mainstream Estonian political parties and European-wide political coalitions. Although the Russophone preferred Center Party has won seats in the past, none consisted of Russophone representatives.

The opening up of a supra-national citizenship scale in 2004 provides a new political site for Russophone political incorporation and engagement within the greater European community. As noted by Kofman, (1995, 133), “will immigrants and refugees at present denied a legitimate presence, be accommodated in a Europe of plural spaces of governance?” in reference to the EU. Although Kofman asked this question in 1995 in reference to transnational migrants, it is still relevant today in this context. The EU furnishes a unique new forum for political engagement that could in turn influence citizenship at the national and sub-national scales. Greater policy harmonization within the greater EU community depends on interactions between the supra-national (EU) and national scales (Kofman 2002). Although EU policy harmonization and influence remain largely ineffectual at the Estonian national scale, Russophone presence at the EU level could change that altogether. An historic precedence of Russophone minority interest was set at the supra-national level during the 1990s and could be harnessed again if the Russophone community would be able to achieve adequate representation at the supra-national scale. Possibly due to the relatively recent Estonian accession to the EU, a disparity in supra-national research in relation to the Russophone population currently exists. These trends suggest the need for further analyses.

Conclusions and Implications for Political Incorporation

The Republic of Estonia is touted as a post-Soviet success story because of Estonia’s rapid economic development, lack of post-Soviet violence, and accession to the EU, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and World Trade Organization (WTO) (Laar 1996; Clemens 2010; Hõbemägi 2010; Skolka 2011). Estonia simultaneously contains the “Achilles heel of the region,” (Crowther and Matonyte 2007). This “Achilles heel” is illustrated by the scalar stratification of Estonian citizenship in relation to the Estonian Russophone population. Minority Russophone access and incorporation to the Estonian scales of citizenship are highly differentiated. Russophones struggle to access formal and substantive citizenship through particular scales or jumping scales. Spatial scales are interconnected, thus struggles for citizenship acquisition at one scale also has a direct impact on citizenship at other scales (Blank 2007).

Minority struggles for citizenship acquisition are not unique to Estonia. Estonia exemplifies one of a myriad of citizenship quandaries stemming from the birth or rebirth of a heterogeneous nation-state. Estonian citizenship policies and minority Russophone population are often highlighted alongside comparable situations in Latvia (Chinn and Truex 1996; Laitin 1998; Gelazis 2004; Lühiste 2006; Kallas 2008; Solska 2011), Lithuania (Chinn and Truex 1996; Gelazis 2004; Lühiste 2006; Solska 2011), Ukraine (Smith and Wilson 1997; Laitin 1998), and Israel (Yiftachel and Ghanem 2004). Latvia in particular shares innumerable historical and demographic parallels with Estonia. Both nation-states were occupied by the Soviet Union and received influxes of Russophones. Both subsequently sought independence through

restorationism and consequently amassed substantial non-citizen Russophone populations (Gelazis 2004; Lühiste 2006; Kallas 2008; Solska 2011).

The restorationist logic behind the independence of Estonia and subsequent implementation of restrictive citizenship policies have made an impact on citizenship at all scales. The overall impact has been the deferment of Russophone political incorporation at the national and supra-national scales. Russophone political party development and voter interest at the national and supra-national scales have also been severely retarded. Russophones have been electorally successful at the sub-national scale, particularly in urban Ida-Viru and Harju Counties. Meanwhile, Russophone-centric parties have largely been irrelevant in Estonian national politics. Most Russophones have also preferred mainstream parties at all national and sub-national scales. Russophones and Russophone community issues have been incorporated by mainstream political parties, particularly the Center Party. Yet this incorporation of voters has yet to bear proportionate representation within the Estonian Parliament and the European Parliament.

The sub-national and supra-national scales provide the most promising potential sites of engagement and political incorporation. The coming decades could witness an increase in sub-national Russophone dominance in urban Ida-Viru and Harju counties. An increase in Russophone dominance will surely influence citizenship at national and supra-national scales. Possible scenarios include an increase in sub-national mobilization, successful development of multi-scalar political elites, and an increase in sub-national pressure on national political institutions concerning Russophone interests. If national formal and substantive citizenship continue to be exclusionary, the sub-national scale will continue to be the major arena of political engagement aimed against the nation-state. An increase in national and supra-national representation through the Estonian and EU Parliaments by Russophones appear unlikely in the foreseeable future. Russophone political struggle at the EU level can influence supra-national citizenship access and reawaken supra-national condemnation of citizenship exclusion at the national-scale. Furthermore, more research is suggested at the supra-national level. Possible research includes: Baltic and EU-wide Russophone community collaboration with EU institutions, the development of supra-national Russophone non-governmental organizations or lobbying groups, and Baltic Russophone supra-national collective mobilization. Supra-national research could shed additional light not only on Russophone, but EU-wide, non-titular minority representation at the supra-national scale.

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KYRGYZ NATIONAL IDENTITY

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Ethnic, national, and religious identity in Central Asia consists a complex series of overlapping and interacting signifiers that have developed in several waves. The most important period for the formation of modern national identification of the various groups in Central Asia took place during the Soviet era (1917-1991). During this time drawing upon existing, but more amorphous ethnic identities, the Soviet government formed the modern nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. The Soviet system created standardized literary languages, national borders, and national histories for these groups. This project began in 1923 with the national delimitation of the borders between what became finally in 1936 five Soviet Socialist Republics (SSR's). It accelerated during the 1920s during the era of *korenizatsiia* (nativization policy) and continued to entrench itself through the remaining seventy years of Soviet rule.

The Soviets drew national borders that had never existed before. For the most part they tried to follow the patterns of ethno-national settlement mainly defined by the newly standardized languages of Uzbek, Tajik, Kyrgyz, Kazakh, and Turkmen. But, this was not completely possible. Large numbers of Tajiks remained in Uzbekistan in Samarkand and Bukhara, for instance, and the predominantly Uzbeks city of Osh was given to Kyrgyzstan. Large-scale Russian and other European settlement aimed at providing skilled workers for industrialization further diluted the titular (dominant) populations of the Central Asian republics. Kazakhs and Kyrgyz for a time became minorities within their own republics. However, symbolic political and cultural hegemony was granted to each titular nationality within its own republic to the detriment of nationalities other than titulars and Russians. A form of indirect rule in which local titular cadres were given preference in government, industry, cultural institutions, and education was established while Moscow maintained all real political and economic control of the territories.¹



¹ Terry Martin, *An Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939* (London: Cornell University Press, 2001); Michael Voslensky, *Nomeklatura: The Soviet Ruling Class: An Insider's Report* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1984), pp. 284-288.

This form of indirect rule had parallels with the system of governance established by Lord Lugard in the British West African colonies using traditional chiefs as intermediaries between the colonial authorities and the population. It differed from traditional British and French colonialism, however, in that while Moscow maintained political and economic control of the territories, it did not economically benefit from them. Instead there was a net transfer of resources from other parts of the USSR into Central Asia. In particular, the Soviet government spent large amounts of money to develop infrastructure, education, industrial complexes, and medical facilities in the region. The result was that they managed to develop a far higher material standard of living under Soviet rule than if they had been independent states without access to the resources provided by Moscow.²

This system of creating national territories, national cultures, national histories, and national elites for each major indigenous ethnic group in the USSR was the longest and deepest structural change imposed upon Eurasia since the Mongol conquest. In Central Asia it resulted in the creation of hard categories of differentiation between peoples based upon a primordial cultural essentialism. The distinctions between Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Turkmens, Tajiks, and others became to be viewed as eternal and unbridgeable.³ In a very real sense *natsionalnost'* (nationality) in the USSR and particularly Central Asia did not differ in any significant way from the concept of race and often operated in a manner similar to the more familiar white-black race relations that characterized places like colonial Rhodesia. For instance, Rasma Karklins gives a number of examples in her book garnered from interviews of German and Mennonite *Aussiedler* (immigrant settlers from the former USSR now living in Germany) of openly racist treatment including physical attacks on ethnic Germans by the titular nationalities in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan during the 1970s.⁴ I myself worked on an asylum case of an ethnic German family from Kazakhstan (Vladimir German and his family) in which the applicant had been brutally assaulted and hospitalized in what can only be described as a racially motivated attack by an ethnic Kazakh. Attempts to create a German autonomous oblast in Kazakhstan in June 1979 led to three days of openly racist demonstrations by Kazakh university professors and students.⁵ These incidents all took place in the 1970s when Soviet political rule still put some limits on the ability of local Central Asian authorities to pursue openly blatant racist policies. Russians, for example, unlike Germans, still had a degree of protection from Moscow at this time.

The formation during Soviet rule of modern Central Asian nationalities drew upon a number of existing signifiers. The most important one was ancestral language which in the fashion of eighteenth-century German thinker Johann Gottfried Herder was said to be evidence of eternal blood lines. In practice, however, the blood lines and not the language itself was what came to be deemed as most important already in the 1930s. For instance, often a Kyrgyz person, especially

² Alec Nove and J. A. Newth, *The Soviet Middle East: A Model For Development?* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1967), pp. 113-122.

³ Valery Tishkov, *The Mind Aflame: Ethnicity, Nationalism & Conflict in and after the Soviet Union* (London: Sage, 1997), pp. 1-4.

⁴ Rasma Karklins, *Ethnic Relations in the USSR: The Perspective from Below* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986), pp. 50-55.

⁵ Pavel Polian, *Against their Will: The History and Geography of Forced Migrations in the USSR* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004), p. 203.

if they are a nationalist politician, whose primary language is Russian and who speaks poor Kyrgyz, will identify one's native language as Kyrgyz and even claim to speak it fluently when in fact one cannot. In contrast the same person will claim that an ethnic Uzbek who speaks fluent Kyrgyz cannot possibly speak good Kyrgyz because that person is ethnically Uzbek. This attitude is very common among the most extreme nationalist elements in Kyrgyzstan.

For most ethnic Kyrgyz, as opposed to the Russified ruling elite, however, the Kyrgyz language is considered an important part of their daily culture. It remains a predominantly oral means of communication. The amount of contemporary writing in Kyrgyz remains limited largely to newspapers, textbooks, and folk tales for children (*skazi*). Kyrgyzstan has produced one great modern writer of international importance, Chingiz Aitmatov (1928-2008). There is no doubt that Aitmatov, whose Kyrgyz father was one of the Communist Party members executed and buried at Chon Tash in 1937, was one of the best writers to come out of the USSR. Aitmatov's writing centered on Kyrgyz themes even though his mother was a Kazan Tatar. Aitmatov grew up in the town of Seker on the border with Kazakhstan in western Talas Oblast.⁶ He is considered the greatest local figure to have come from Talas, even overshadowing the Second World War hero Cholponbai.⁷ However, Aitmatov did not write exclusively in Kyrgyz. Much of his writing was originally done in Russian in order to claim a larger audience in the USSR as a whole and abroad. Other than Aitmatov there is not much emphasis on written Kyrgyz literature.

Orally the most important work in Kyrgyzstan is the epic *Manas* which had traditionally been sung by Kyrgyz bards. *Manas* received important reinforcement as a central historical and cultural centerpiece of Kyrgyz culture in 1937 when the Soviet government unearthed the grave of the historical Manas and eventually created a museum and park around it in Talas Oblast.⁸ Written and, much more importantly, oral versions of the *Manas* epic have continued to proliferate, forming one of the core myths of early Kyrgyz history.

Other oral sources of Kyrgyz language cultural production that have continued to flourish as a result of having a strong popular base include music, film, and comedy. Local Kyrgyz television, clubs, cinemas, and especially DVD's have all shown that a vibrant modern Kyrgyz language culture does exist and continues to grow. Not surprisingly this culture remains predominantly oral rather than written. Also, despite claims by political demagogues, this culture is in no way threatened by the parallel international cultural products consumed in Russian translation by the same Kyrgyz audience. Hence typical Kyrgyz people will watch both local Kyrgyz language cultural productions as well as American, South Korean, and Turkish shows dubbed over in Russian, as well as products from Russia and other former Soviet republics produced in Russian. The kids watching Sponge Bob in Russian are the same people listening to Kyrgyz language pop music and stand-up comedy.

In addition to language, other features of modern Kyrgyz identity concern the historical connection with the former Soviet Union, particularly its great victory over Nazi Germany on 9 May 1945, and Islam. Like other post-Soviet nationalities, the Soviet defeat of Germany during

⁶ In the summer of 2013 I traveled to the Aitmatov Museum in Seker.

⁷ On that same trip I visited the Cholponbai War Memorial.

⁸ I also toured this park and museum in the summer of 2013.

the Second World War remains the single greatest legitimizing factor of both the Soviet and the post-Soviet regimes. A number of important war heroes did come from Kyrgyzstan, most notably General Panifilov, who has an amusement park in Bishkek named after him.⁹ Yet in recent times there has been an effort to stress only the role of ethnically Kyrgyz war heroes and to downplay the role of Russians, Tatars, and even ethnic Germans who were awarded medals by the Soviet government for their valor in fighting the Nazis.¹⁰ Thus Panifilov, who died while successfully stopping the German advance on Moscow, has recently been overshadowed by Cholponbai, a Kyrgyz soldier from Talas Oblast killed during the war in a suicide attack. During the war the NKVD deported a large number of Karachais, Chechens, Ingush, and Balkars as “special settlers” to Kyrgyzstan. Local Kyrgyz authorities for the most part treated these deportees quite poorly and largely bought into the official lie that they were traitors to the USSR. An example of the worst such treatment is found in Alexander Statiev’s article “Intent vs. Outcome” where he notes that three collective farms in Jalal-Abad Oblast had “special settler” death rates of 85%, 90%, and 92% in 1944-1945 because of Kyrgyz officials stealing all their food.¹¹ These represented the highest death rates experienced by any category of “special settlers” in the USSR. The experience of the deported people in Kyrgyzstan, unlike in Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan, has received absolutely no official recognition or memorialization. It remains a largely forgotten and unknown piece of history outside of the communities directly victimized by these crimes.

The celebration of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany on 9 May 1945 is, of course, as described above not an accurate collective memory in Kyrgyzstan or other Central Asian states. It has instead been morphed into a celebration of ethnic Kyrgyz martial prowess to the exclusion of the contribution of other nationalities and a complete absence of any critical analysis of Soviet behavior during the war. Indeed, the entire war is portrayed as a great victory for the Soviet Union, which in the context of individual republics means the titular nationality over Fascism. It is thus a justification for the Soviet and post-Soviet governments regardless of their incompetence and repression. In Kyrgyzstan, which has experienced two revolutions since the collapse of the USSR, this strategy has proved far less effective than it has in Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan. Nonetheless, the strategy does in fact contribute in all the former Soviet states to a continued marginalization of those nationalities declared treasonous by the Stalin regime and deported to “special settlements” in Central Asia. Similarly, it strengthens the position of the titular nationalities in the now independent states.

Besides the historical connection to the Soviet Union, Islam was adopted into Kyrgyz culture on Kyrgyz terms, and its practice remains very different among the Kyrgyz than among Arabs or other Islamic peoples. The Kyrgyz never adopted the veil, and today the most notable features of Islam practiced by the Kyrgyz are male circumcision, Muslim burial, reciting a short prayer

⁹ A statue of General Panifilov stands near the gates of the amusement park.

¹⁰ Afanasii Kluger from the German settlement of Luxemburg in Kyrgyzstan just outside of Frunze (Bishkek) received the Order of the Red Star in February 1942 for his participation in the defence of Moscow against the Nazis. See G.K. Krongardt, *Nemtsy v Kyrgyzstane: 1880-1990 gg.* (Bishkek: Ilim, 1997), p. 235.

¹¹ Alexander Statiev, “Soviet Ethnic Deportations: Intent vs. Outcome,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 11, no. 2-3 (June-September 2009): p. 254.

after eating, avoidance of pork, and celebration of *Eid*.¹² Very few Kyrgyz regularly attend *mechet* (mosque) or fast during Ramadan. Alcohol is widely consumed here even during Ramadan. Islam is largely adhered to as a set of symbols rather than a religious practice defining the Kyrgyz as Central Asian and not European, such as the Pravoslav Russians or Mennonite Germans. They identify as Muslim because it is considered like *Manas* to be part of an essential Kyrgyz identity. But overall, the practice of Islam, aside from avoiding pork, does not hold any everyday meaning for most Kyrgyz, who became highly secularized during the Soviet era.

The modern national identity of the Kyrgyz and other Central Asian peoples has largely been constructed by deliberate policies during the Soviet era. Their education has taught them that they are the only national group with rights to a specified territory and that all other nationalities within in it are guests at best. The constructed national identity of the Kyrgyz has relied upon language, literature, history, and to a much lesser extent a highly secularized version of Islam. The Soviet interpretation of Kyrgyz history still remains the official orthodox one with the exception of the recent downgrading of the role of the Russian “big brother” in helping them develop as modern people. There remains little real introspection or critical analysis of the actual history of Kyrgyzstan as a poly-ethnic state, both as part of the USSR and as a formally independent state.

¹² Across the world Muslims enthusiastically celebrate *Eid* three times a year, one of which marks the conclusion of the Islamic holy month of Ramadan.

THE LINGUISTIC LEGACY OF THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE

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Few events in American history carry the geographical, cultural, and linguistic significance of the Louisiana Purchase. On 20 December 1803, the flag of France was taken down for the last time on North American soil and was replaced by the flag of the United States of America; subsequently, the size of the nation doubled. Free navigation of the Mississippi River enabled American commerce and migration, guaranteed the movement of American English west of the Mississippi, and, ultimately, cemented its place as the exclusive spoken language from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The effects of the Louisiana Purchase were not altogether positive. The idea of an “Empire of Liberty,” as promoted by Thomas Jefferson, held dire linguistic consequences for the indigenous people of North America. As Connie Eble states, “Seldom, if ever, has a single language driven by a single political power expanded so rapidly over such a



vast area, replacing or reducing to clearly minority status all the established languages in its path” (349). This article will illustrate the regional aspects, dispersal characteristics, and features of this “common language” and will explain the eventual deleterious effects on Native American languages. In order to achieve a holistic and practical understanding of the linguistic legacy of the Louisiana Purchase, this discussion provides information on the “English Only” movement and subsequent legislation in the state of Oklahoma.

Perhaps no other region in the newly acquired geographical territory of the Louisiana Purchase contained the eclectic cultural, ethnic, and linguistic makeup than that of New Orleans. In 1817, Samuel R. Brown wrote: “Here in half an hour you can see and speak to Frenchman, Spaniards, Danes, Swedes, Germans, Englishmen, Portuguese, Hollanders, Mexicans, Kentuckians, Tennesseans, Ohionians, Pennsylvanians, New-Yorkers, New-Englanders, and a motley groupe [sic] of Indians, Quadroons and Africans” (148). Furthermore, Richard W. Bailey, in his article “The Foundation of English in the Louisiana Purchase: New Orleans, 1800-1850,” indicates that “Brown saw this linguistic abundance as something genuinely remarkable, a social fact not equaled elsewhere in his broad survey of the United States and the territories dependent on it”

(366). This clearly indicates that communication at the time of the Louisiana Purchase was a multicultural, multiregional, and multilingual affair.

To comprehend the linguistic role of New Orleans at the time of the Louisiana Purchase, it is crucial to recognize that the region was multilingual prior to the arrival of the Americans and of the Europeans in the Western Hemisphere. Because of the notable linguistic diversity of the region, various ethnic groups needed some type of common ground from which they could communicate, especially regarding economic trade. This led to the development of pidgin languages. Pidgins are formed through the incorporation of sounds and words from preexisting languages. Emmanuel J. Drechsel calls this “A linguistic compromise resulting from tertiary hybridization in a truly multilingual situation” (167). According to Bailey, the Mobilian jargon, a form of pidgin, “[...] was widespread in the lower part of the Mississippi watershed from Georgia to Texas and northward into Illinois and eastern Missouri” (368). In addition to the language communities and groups composed predominantly of Francophone Acadian refugees or “Cajuns” and Haitian slaves, other groups such as German immigrants and Spanish-speaking migrants from the Canary Islands also inhabited New Orleans in the early nineteenth century. Apart from the English-speaking Irish immigrants who arrived in New Orleans prior to the Louisiana Purchase, the geographical territory west of the Mississippi had yet to be penetrated by a distinctly American form of English.

Language diversity within English, as Bailey notes, “[...] was, however, most spectacularly seen in the swarms of people who arrived from elsewhere in the United States” (371). These “westerners” as they were called came from Kentucky in an effort to take advantage of the Ohio and Mississippi trade routes. Subsequently, the ethnic, cultural, and linguistic diversity already present in New Orleans increased with the addition of these “internal migrants,” making the region a focal point for linguistic change. Essentially, the aforementioned ethnic groups began to experience a decrease in the usage of their particular languages as the influence of the “westerners” began to take hold. Bailey states that, “The Germans and Irish were poor and few; the Spanish, even fewer, were marginalized once they had ceded political power first to the French and then to the Americans” (373). This linguistic turmoil led to the merging of many forms of spoken American English into languages of the community, which reflected stereotypes of English speech.

Another important consideration with respect to language development and language characteristics concerns the Native American and free black communities that existed prior to the forced relocation of 1830. The Natchez Trace, a major pathway that extended from Nashville, Tennessee, to Natchez, Mississippi, contained many of these communities. Natchez, essentially a satellite of New Orleans, became a center of linguistic intermingling. This eclectic sociocultural environment proliferated the use of “contact languages,” such as American Indian Pidgin English.

As the entry point for numerous migrants and the leveling of dialectal varieties that followed, New Orleans became the source for the eventual movement of English to the upriver settlements and to the American heartland. As Bailey notes, “New Orleans was a place where language change was rapid and uniformity emerged from multilingual and multidialectal diversity” (381). Essentially, the Louisiana Purchase cleared the way for aggressive political and institutional

policies which sought the assimilation of all minority languages and cultures into a unified American identity.

Although not a focal point of this discussion, the Indian Removal Act of 1830 played a key role in the aggressive assimilation policies of the United States government. Additionally, this legislation was the catalyst for the subsequent cultural disintegration of the Native Americans. Eble, in her essay, *The Louisiana Purchase and American English*, remarks that

Their way of life was not to survive American expansion in the nineteenth century. Governmental policies forced Native Americans onto reservations and limited their educational opportunities to English-only schools. Ultimately, the Louisiana Purchase diminished the number of speakers of indigenous languages and brought many of their languages to the brink of extinction (351).

The spread of American English involved much more than the linguistic intermingling mentioned previously. American English is intrinsically tied to the concepts of Manifest Destiny and American exceptionalism, which politically justified imperialistic and institutional expansion policies first promoted by Thomas Jefferson and later by Andrew Jackson. Historian William E. Weeks notes that three key themes were usually cited by advocates of Manifest Destiny: the virtue of the American people and their institutions; the mission to spread these institutions, thereby redeeming and remaking the world in the image of the United States; and the destiny under God to do this work (61).

Jefferson's "Empire of Liberty" concept was, in part, fueled by his desire to assimilate the "noble savages" into the American body politic as full citizens. A major component of this assimilation was a uniform language. On 24 November 1801, Jefferson articulated his vision in a message to James Monroe: "It is impossible not to look forward to distant times, when our rapid multiplication will expand itself ... and cover the whole northern, if not the southern, continent with a people speaking the same language, governed in similar forms, and by similar laws" (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert E. Bergh 296). Linguistically speaking, Jefferson's vision had begun to materialize in the form of a national consciousness. As Albert C. Baugh and Thomas Cable indicate, "Americans were beginning to be conscious of their language and to believe that it might be destined to have a future as glorious as that which they confidently expected for the country itself" (355). This awareness of the importance of an "American English" transcended the North American continent. In consideration of the formation of republics, John Adams cited the linguistic examples of France, Spain, and Italy, who formed national academies for the improvement of their languages. Subsequently, this served to elevate the political motivations for the spread of English as a common and ubiquitous language. In 1780, Adams illuminated these motivations in a letter to the president of the Congress:

English is destined to be in the next and succeeding centuries more generally the language of the world than Latin was in the last or France in the present age. The reason of this is obvious, because the increasing population in America, and their universal connection and correspondence with all nations will, aided by the influence of England in the world, whether great or small, force their language into general use, in spite of all the obstacles that may be thrown in their way (357).

Not only does Adams's statement serve as a summation of the future ideals of American expansionism, but it emphasizes the crucial role of language in establishing a national identity. Furthermore, Adams alludes to the future relationship between the United States government and the Native Americans. Indeed, the Native Americans would be viewed as an obstacle, and the institution of American English would be forced upon them.



A well-established historical framework of the assimilationist and expansionist agenda of the United States government leading up to and succeeding the Louisiana Purchase allows for a more lucid discussion and understanding of the institutional policies practiced in the United States and the detrimental effects upon Native Americans. A specific example of institutional targeting occurred following the Congressional establishment of the Indian Peace Commission in 1867. In a statement issued in 1868, the commission concluded: "In the difference of language today lies two-thirds of our trouble. Schools should be established, which children should be required to attend; their barbarous dialects should be blotted out and the English language substituted" (J.D. Atkins 1887). This mandate embodied the philosophy of the boarding school system established by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).

Under the auspices of education, a much broader campaign of cultural and linguistic assimilation occurred. According to James Crawford, "Under strict English Only rules, students were punished and humiliated for speaking their native language as a part of a general campaign to wipe out every vestige of their Indian-ness" (27). In the same manner that the Cherokees were shunned by the United States government, in spite of their successful assimilation efforts, so too were the successful Native American students in BIA schools. Crawford laments that "the English Only policy did take a toll on the pride and identity of many Indians, alienating them from their cultural roots and from their tribes" (27). This development has led to an oppositional attitude toward bilingual education among Native Americans who recall the ignominies they suffered in BIA boarding schools.

The result of systematic cultural and linguistic assimilation tactics employed by the United States government is a microcosm of a larger phenomenon known as language loss or language shift. This development is simply a change in the primary language used for communication of a particular culture or subculture. Crawford indicates that "The phenomenon of language loss is especially acute in North America" (18). Of the estimated 155 indigenous languages currently being spoken in the United States, 135 are considered moribund. Furthermore, in Oklahoma, only two of twenty-three native languages are being learned by children (M. Krauss 1992). This figure indicates that Native American languages are quickly becoming endangered.

The loss of indigenous languages invites numerous theories of correlation and causation, such as the ecological parallels of Stephen Wurm, who suggested that “Languages must adapt or perish” (9), and the functional model proposed by Norman Denison, who states that

A speech community sometimes decides, for reasons of functional economy, to suppress a part of itself. There comes a point when multilingual parents no longer consider it necessary or worthwhile for the future of their children to communicate with them in a low-prestige language variety, and when children are no longer motivated to acquire active competence in a language which is lacking in positive connotations such as youth, modernity, technical skills, material success, and education (24).

Dennison’s explanation, in part, most accurately describes language shift and language loss among the Native Americans. Other causes, which reflect the actions of the United States government, appeal to western values such as the spread of consumerism and individualism; pressures for assimilation into dominant cultures; and conscious policies of repression directed at indigenous groups (Crawford 22). Indeed, these factors are currently threatening the cultural and linguistic diversity of the Native Americans.

English only sentiments persisted into the twentieth century, embracing the aforementioned assimilationist foundations. The legislative efforts of the modern era were preliminarily voiced by Theodore Roosevelt in 1907, who wrote: “We have room for but one language in this country and that is the English language, for we intend to see that the crucible turns our people out as Americans, of American nationality, and not as dwellers in a polyglot boarding house” (554). Aggressive integration campaigns continued throughout the 1960s and 1970s, in spite of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Bilingual Education Act of 1968. Ethnic children were placed in segregated schools, which utilized the cultural concepts and values of the social majority (Pac 194). This action resulted in a subtractive method of English acquisition, which Phillipson labeled “linguistic imperialism” (36).

What is generally referred to as the “modern English-only movement” is comprised of a series of legislative actions, political lobbying organizations, and activist coalitions that proliferated in the 1980s. In 1980, Dade County residents approved an anti-bilingual ordinance following an influx of Cuban immigrants. In 1981, English was declared the official language in the state of Virginia, and in 1983, Dr. John Tanton and U.S. Senator S. I. Hayakawa founded a political lobbying organization called U.S. English. Although these initiatives did not specifically target Native Americans, the message of assimilation and acculturation is consistent and carries the same xenophobic agenda.


The debate over English-only is not immune to partisan politics. This is indicated by Teresa Pac, who states that “The nativist English-only ideology culminates in the Republicans’ persistent attempt to declare English as the official language of the United States constitutionally” (197). In 2006, Republican Senator James Inhofe of Oklahoma introduced an amendment to the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act, which stated that the federal government would no longer provide multilingual communications and services, except for those already guaranteed by law. Additionally, the amendment sought to make English the “national language” and require new citizens to pass an English proficiency test. Democratic Senator Ken Salazar of Colorado also introduced a bill which declared English as the “common unifying language of the

United States.” However, neither bill managed to pass the House of Representatives. Pac continues to emphasize that “The National Language Act has been reintroduced in Congress annually” (197). This trend indicates emphatically that the nativist agenda exhibited by the United States is an inherent and ongoing phenomenon.

Recently, the English-only movement has come home to Oklahoma. In November of 2010, Oklahoma became the thirty-first state to approve an Official English regulation, labeled SQ751 (Anna Kaganiec-Kamienska 185). In part, the amendment to the state constitution reads: “As English is the common and unifying language of the state of Oklahoma, all official actions of the state shall be conducted in the English language, except as required by federal law.” It is important to note that while a significant number of states have adopted similar measures, nothing has been enacted at the federal level. While the official language of the amendment appears innocuous, as it apparently applies solely to official state business, significant opposition is being voiced. Chad Smith, former Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation, in his editorial from *cherookeephoenix.org*, states that

“English Only” is really about the political fear of someone being different or smarter because they can speak a language that others cannot. It is political bullying, firmly planted in intolerance, hatred, fear, and the federal English only policies that led to my dad having his mouth washed out with soap for speaking Cherokee in federal boarding school.

Still, others downplay its significance. According to Steven Bender, “These official English laws appear on their face to have little more [legal] significance than a state’s choice of an official motto or the official state bird” (1095). Whether these state initiatives simply promote official unity or intolerance is an ongoing debate, but the English-only movement appears to enjoy considerable momentum.



Discussions of the Louisiana Purchase rarely include its impact, both past and present, on the English language as the primary force behind nativist and assimilationist political agendas, which have made a profound impact the American cultural identity. Language, perhaps more than any other factor, is a defining characteristic of culture and national identity. John Adams recognized this fact and subsequently promoted the proliferation and improvement of American English as the primary means of placing America on a level playing field with other European powers. Thomas Jefferson imagined an “Empire of Liberty,” unified by a single language, stretching from coast to coast, which would be unique among the world’s nations. In the subsequent aggressiveness of Andrew Jackson and the Indian Removal Act of 1830, Native Americans were viewed as an obstacle and threat to a unified American culture. In the late nineteenth century, the establishment of boarding schools, whose principal aim was to replace Indian languages with English, immersed Native American children in European-American culture. Carol Schmid states that “Boarding schools led to a ‘cultural disintegration’ of Native American children and are often seen as responsible for the problems Indian communities face today” (23). This legacy of nativism continued into the twentieth century, and rhetoric by Theodore Roosevelt served as a catalyst for the English Only movement in the United States.

Presently, this movement is affecting citizens in the state of Oklahoma through SQ 751, which establishes English as the official language of the state of Oklahoma. Although it is not the aim of this discussion to take a political position on the English Only movement or its foundational policies, it is crucial to understand the historical, cultural, and linguistic forces which created a political vision for a unique “American” identity. Furthermore, it is necessary to appreciate the toll these assimilationist political agendas have taken on the Native Americans and other minority cultures. The positive connotation of the “melting pot” metaphor employed to present the United States as an ideal republic was articulated by John Hector Crevecoeur:

What then is the American, this new man? that the American is one who leaving behind him all his ancient prejudices and manners, receives new ones from the new mode of life he has embraced, the government he obeys, and the new rank he holds. He becomes an American by being received in the broad lap of our great Alma Mater. Here individuals of all nations are *melting* into a new race of men, whose labors and posterity will one day cause great changes in the world (106).

In response to this definition of the “American,” the question remains: Has the United States truly embraced minority cultures in this way? Although Crevecoeur’s statement embodies the Jeffersonian ideal regarding an “Empire of Liberty,” united under a common language, the aggressive efforts employed by the United States government to eliminate all linguistic vestiges of the Native American people appear contradictory to the idea of immigrants and Native Americans as integral and equal contributors to our great Alma Mater.

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**"OF COURSE, MR. KENNEDY IS IN THE CLAN, AND ASHLEY, TOO.
THEY ARE MEN, AREN'T THEY?": CITIZENS, CODES AND
THE POST-BELLUM SOUTH**

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On April 10, 1865, President Abraham Lincoln addressed a crowd gathered at the White House to hear his plans for the upcoming years of Reconstruction following the surrender of General Lee's Army the previous day. As told by historian Doris Kearns Goodwin, when Mr. Lincoln "spoke of his desire to extend [voting] suffrage to black Americans" who were either "literate" and had served in the Union ranks, one particular man in the audience remarked to his companion for the evening, that "[t]his means nigger citizenship. That is the last speech he will ever make'" (728). Given how these men and others in their company had been already plotting either to kidnap or assassinate Mr. Lincoln, the statement by John Wilkes Booth to Lewis Powell only served to heighten their desire to defend the nature of the Southern cause that, as of the day previous, was already lost (735).

Beyond their plan itself, however, Booth's fear of black citizenship portrays a larger issue around which both the war and, as it happened, post-bellum American life significantly revolved (Stephens qtd. in McPherson 3; Stephens qtd. in Gallagher 20). As historian Don Fehrenbacher described in his work on the *Dred Scott* case of 1857 (hereafter, *Dred Scott v. Sanford*), questions of personhood and citizenship in the United States, from the early Revolution, the first days of the Republic and through the start of sectional warfare in 1861, had been central to American conceptions of race and gender as they reflected on the overarching issue of slavery (2-4; 12-16; 16; 20-21). Lincoln's desire for some black males, many of whom were, of course, former slaves, to receive the right to vote would become, as Booth clearly understood, a recognition of not simply legal, but, in relatively short order, socio-cultural equality (Goodwin 728). That fear of social equality, in turn, led to what Thomas Dixon, through his turn-of-the-century trilogy of novels on the Ku Klux Klan, called the prospect of mongrelization and the diluting of the Anglo-Saxon race (*The Leopard's Spots* 198; 382). As Dixon's trilogy further suggests, the reaction of white post-bellum Southerners was both swift and skilled.

Several critics in the last twenty-five years have, of course, discussed "how and why" Dixon's work "dedicated [to] shaping white Americans' conception of their history and culture" was "received by white Americans" ("Introduction" 2; Lyerly 80-104; Wells 118-142). One particular means by which he seemed to express these attitudes, however, has thus far remained unexplored. From mention in his pre-trilogy sermon "The Battle Cry of Freedom," given to his non-denominational "Church of the People" in New York, through repeated mention within his Klan trilogy, Dixon's use of the term "citizen" (or "citizens" and "citizenship"), particularly as one in a chain of historical references that even indirectly relate to the Civil War, suggests a topic worthy of exploration (Wells 118-119; *The Leopard's Spots* 49; 104; *The Clansman* 46; 246; *The Traitor* n.p.; 39). Beyond even Dixon's use of such a provocative term, however, was its use by other Southern writers of the post-bellum era. These additional references stood uniquely within their

own stories, but also gave additional perspective to the longstanding and still unsettled question of citizenship within the American Republic (Fehrenbacher 2; 61; *Gone with the Wind* 841; 842; "Forrest's Last Charge" 308; 315).

Only three years after *Dred Scott v. Sanford* had supposedly settled the legal standing of black slaves as genetically inferior beings, seven, then eleven, Southern states seceded from the Union in an effort to form a confederacy of states based upon, expressed by the words of its Vice President Alexander Stephens given in March of 1861, "'the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery, subordination to the superior race, is his natural and normal condition'" (Hurst 65-67; qtd. in McPherson 3; Gallagher 20). Further enshrined in the Confederate Constitution as a "'right of property,'" "slavery," according to Stephens in the same early 1861 speech, served as "the cornerstone" of "our new Government, [and] is the first, in the history of the world, based upon this great physical, philosophical, and moral truth'" (qtd. in Gallagher 20; McPherson 3; qtd. in McPherson 3). Within such a historical context that, in some way, extended back even to the first unloading of African slaves at Jamestown, Virginia, in 1619, Mississippi's declaration in its November 30, 1860 ordinance of secession that the "northern states had "'insulted and outraged our citizens when travelling among them for pleasure, health, or business, by taking their servants and liberating the same" while further "'subjecting their owners to degrading and ignominious punishment'" comes as no surprise (qtd. 61). By literally connecting their notion of "citizen" directly to its white slave owners, however, Mississippi's statement of secession only heightens the sense of a word that had carried a unique form of cultural power well before Mr. Lincoln's election in 1860 (Fehrenbacher 61; qtd. 61; Goodwin 277-278). In the immediate years and generations after the war, that power would assume an even more particular form of understanding.

With the granting of full legal rights to black Americans through the enactment of the postwar Constitutional Amendments, in particular the Fourteenth whose first sentence specifically defined citizenship within American life, much more stood at stake than simply the power of the vote (580). Despite its federal imprimatur, "citizen" soon came to be defined by white Southerners as part of the Lost Cause ideology which "had profound religious, social and psychological functions ... for a society that suffered from defeat, humiliation, and internal dissension" (Silber 5; 18). Within such an interplay of contexts, it is not unusual that the Klan, or entities similar to it, came to have such a central place in postwar white Southern culture (Trelease xi-xiii; Hurst 294-295). As part of their response to the Klan's founding, these Southerners quickly began to develop a series of signals through which members could communicate allegiance, or at least tacit approval, to any person who chose to grasp its implications (Trelease 10-11; 16). As historian Allen W. Trelease discusses in *White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and Southern Reconstruction* (1971), in order to preserve the strictly oral nature of its associations, the earliest Klan organizations in Tennessee developed "a code by which to designate months, days and hours" (16). Such codes were "primarily used for public announcement of meetings that appeared in newspapers through the spring of 1868" (16). Trelease writes further that "reference[s] to secret grips, signs, and passwords" were made, but remained principally unspecified until they appeared to pass away "like the original amusements" of the first several meetings in Pulaski, Tennessee (16; 18). Trelease's history, while providing an overall background to the Klan's origins and rise throughout white Southern culture, does not extend into how these "grips, signs, and passwords" came all but certainly to include "citizen" as having

some relationship to its larger aspirations of “curbing lawlessness, Unionism and above all keeping the Negro in his place” (16). Even as he does not delve into the implications of the Klan’s language beyond its printed rituals, Trelease still helps to establish the parameters through which such a utilization came to occur (14-19). Within such a framework and its eventual linkage to the growing and post-bellum discussions of “citizen,” in what might otherwise appear to be only a minor coincidence, it becomes notably of interest that one of the Klan’s original founders, Frank O. McCord, made his postwar living as publisher of the local newspaper entitled the *Pulaksi Citizen* (3; 8). That McCord also came to serve as Grand Cyclops of his local Klan, especially within the larger series of controversies concerning the nature of American citizenship and black male suffrage, simply cannot be dismissed as mere accident (8). The clear allusions to these historical links later made by the three writers in immediate question, Dixon, Irvin S. Cobb and Margaret Mitchell, only reflect the eventual acceptance and use of a code that came to be known with great speed, it seems, throughout white southern society after 1865 (*Gone with the Wind* 841-842; *The Leopard’s Spots* 442; “Forrest’s Last Charge” 308; 315). In his biography of Confederate General John B. Gordon, historian Ralph Eckert indicates that while “it is almost impossible to get beyond the shroud of secrecy surrounding [the Klan’s rituals and codes],” there remain several hints throughout white post-1865 Southern literature that from its earliest days through at least Mitchell’s *Gone With the Wind* (1936), some type of code, based upon an ideological framework focusing on the relationship between questions of citizenship, masculinity and the Klan, entered the discourses of white Southerners soon after 1865 (145).

While some codes of the Klan, as Trelease explains, came, over time, to disappear from their meanings within original rituals, such does not mean that they were no longer used in later manifestations (93). The Knights of the White Camellia (KWC), centered in the Trans-Mississippi states and even a predecessor of the Klan in Louisiana, “had an elaborate ritual and initiation ceremony, together with signs, grips, and passwords” (93). Despite, as Trelease writes, its “avowedly racist” “Charge to Initiates,” not making specific references to “citizen” or “citizenship,” the KWC still establishes the notions of divinely sanctioned white supremacy which gave rise and subsequent resistance to any form of black male suffrage (93; Goodwin 728). It consequently does not take much of a leap to connect the post-bellum threads of relationship between fear of black male suffrage, the Klan’s sense of itself as cultural Guardian of the Lost Cause, and the shroud enveloping the use, definition and understanding of “citizen” for at least seventy years after Appomattox (*Gone with the Wind* 841-842; *The Leopard’s Spots* 442; “Forrest’s Last Charge” 308; 315).

Despite the lack of an overt statement, verbal or written, that directly links “citizen” to the Klan’s sense of itself, it became one of several historical and literary expressions that framed allusions to long-standing cultural discourses of great power (*Gone with the Wind* 842; *The Leopard’s Spots* 442; “Forrest’s Last Charge” 308). Within only a year after the Confederacy’s surrender the foundational Klan, even in its earliest organizational matrices, came to view itself as having a central role in the maintenance of the white South’s conception of racial hegemony (Trelease 16). Through at the very least the first third of the twentieth century, there existed a relationship between that hegemony and the specific ways that the Klan utilized the term “citizen” (*Gone with the Wind* 841-842; *The Leopard’s Spots* 442; “Forrest’s Last Charge” 308; 315). One such way became, logically enough considering the “humiliation” felt over losing a war they believed God had ordained for them to win, a means by which white Southerners received solace and strength

concerning their own place in the post-bellum order (Genovese 3-33; Silber 7; Mills xv-xxx; Noll 2; 21; 23; 142-143). In short, the word “citizen” quickly came, for many white Southerners, to signify more than a controversy over having the right to vote; it also served, under specific conditions with certain people, as a code for either recognition, tacit acceptance or perhaps even membership within a given Klan organization.

The knowledge of such a link, however, does not suggest that all post-bellum white Southerners accepted the Klan’s understanding and use of citizenship. Indeed, there are also indications that at least one preeminent white writer who rose to popularity at the height of the Lost Cause’s cultural influence used his fiction to construct a counter-narrative to the Klan as well as the Cause (Chatterton “Preface.” n.p.). In the decade after Dixon penned his trilogy and as D. W. Griffith maneuvered toward putting its adaptation on movie screens, the Kentucky writer Irvin S. Cobb began to publish what became twenty years of stories that mostly focused on his home of Paducah, a town along the Ohio River just north and east of Cairo, Illinois (“Introduction” 7-8; Stokes 81-109; Lawson 1-2; Cobb *Exit Laughing* 40). Setting his fiction in Fairfield, and modelled after Paducah, Cobb centers these stories that explore the relationship between Circuit Court Judge William Pittman Priest, his brother veterans from the cavalry of General Nathan Bedford Forrest, and their fellow post-bellum townsfolk (*The Sun Shines Bright*; Lawson xi-xii; Chatterton 1-2; 91-92). Reading his fiction without a background in the historiography of the Lost Cause, however, creates a propensity for misreading, especially in the light of the movement toward Civil Rights after World War II (Chatterton *Irvin S. Cobb* 16; 131; Lawson 14). If read simply through the base regional and post-bellum early twentieth century contexts, the preponderance of Cobb’s stories might appear as only local color yarns apparently designed to entertain their Northern, while appeasing their Southern, audiences (Chatterton *Irvin S. Cobb* 44-46). In point of fact, Cobb penned a cultural critique of how the Lost Cause came to be the hegemonic discourse by which a post-bellum and reconciled American society saw itself (Silber 1-10). By examining the specific use of “citizen” in a representative story published during 1916, I will argue how Cobb both understood its link to the Klan and its undercurrent of white Southern masculinity (“Forrest’s Last Charge” 280-323). More to the point, the manner in which Cobb uses “citizen” throughout his story, even while it seemingly endorses the Southern view of post-Reconstruction American life, actually serves as a code within the code to undermine the root operating discourses of the Lost Cause (“Forrest’s Last Charge” 308; 315).

Prior to discussing Cobb’s counter-narrative, however, an initial focus on *Gone with the Wind* will be followed by an examination of Dixon’s Klan trilogy. Both Mitchell and Dixon offer ample, if suggestive, evidence, concerning the postwar link between an understanding of “citizen” and the Klan (*Gone with the Wind* 841-842; *The Leopard’s Spots* 409-414; *The Traitor* n.p.; 39). Rooted in history, but expressed, as necessary, with brute power, these citizen Klansmen helped, as D. W. Griffith and Dixon so aptly put it, give birth to a new nation by preserving the racial lie at the center of their ideology (Stokes 13-14; *The Leopard’s Spots* 334; Trelease 16).

Specific to *Gone with the Wind*, Mitchell describes the events surrounding General Gordon’s campaign for Georgia’s governorship in 1868 (842). At the same time, Mitchell intermingles these events with the soon-to-be announced engagement of Rhett Butler to Scarlett O’Hara Hamilton Kennedy (842). Mitchell has earlier established that Rhett carried the brand of a disreputable scalawag for both his speculative activities during the war and his open association with the

Yankees after its end (280; 840). Even after saving several prominent men from Yankee clutches in the Sullivan raid, Rhett is still hated by virtually all the ladies in Atlanta society (840-841). These ladies did not, of course, regret that Rhett had saved "their men," as Mitchell writes, but only that the means he used to trick the Yankees were of such an "[un]seemly" manner (840). If, these ladies believed, "the good of the Klan" had been central to Rhett's "heart, he would have managed the affair" in a more respectable manner (840).

In such a social background, and with the Klan's activities known throughout Atlanta society, General Gordon was seeking the governorship of his home state. Mitchell portrays the election by these words:

A week before Rhett and Scarlett announced their engagement, an election for governor had been held. The Southern Democrats has General John B. Gordon, one of Georgia's best loved and most honored citizens, as their candidate. Opposing him was a Republican named [Rufus] Bullock. The election had lasted three days instead of one. Trainloads of negroes had been rushed from town to town, voting at every precinct along the way. Of course, Bullock had won.... And Rhett Butler was a friend of the hated Bullock! (842)

On at least two other occasions, Mitchell specifically uses the words "citizen" or "citizens" with reference to white Georgians regarding their conjoined functions of civic responsibility and social order (653; 658). In the present instance, however, Mitchell not only bemoans the lapsing of these previously unchallenged obligations. Through her specific reference to General Gordon, she hints at something beyond his factual campaign for governor and, at least in 1868, his defeat for that office (842; Eckert 143-145). As General Gordon ran for the state's highest office, it was also widely recognized that he was "often referred to [as the Grand Dragon]" of Georgia's Klan organization (145). By the time of that first gubernatorial race, the Klan, of course, had made its presence felt across the Reconstruction South (Trelease 3-5). In Georgia specifically, its activities had become noticeably violent, perhaps not so coincidentally, during the same year as the gubernatorial contest between General Gordon and Mr. Bullock (226-227; 234-236). Despite later claims that its first incarnation was a "'brotherhood of property-holders" who had peace in their hearts and were only trying to fend off "'the threat' posed by the black population that [Gordon] believed was largely ignorant," it was all too clear that Klan activities were based upon far more than a desire to maintain the presumed social harmony between white and black Southerners (145-146; Trelease 234-236).

Even as Darden Asbury Pyron's *Southern Daughter: The Life of Margaret Mitchell* (1991) only refers to any overt Klan activities through its appearance in her novel, Mitchell suggests its historical presence through General Gordon's 1868 race for the Governor's chair (236; 288-289; 312; 382; *Gone with the Wind* 828; Eckert 145). Introduced "habitually" at political rallies well into the 1880s as "'the hero of Appomattox,'" General Gordon's historical legacy easily gave root to Mitchell's literary imagination as she reflected on the issues surrounding the war, Reconstruction and her early life in Atlanta (Stokes 178; Pyron 28; 310). While not ascertainable in a final sense, by labelling General Gordon as "one of Georgia's best loved and most honored citizens," Mitchell almost certainly may have echoed more about the nature of his postwar associations than he would have comfortably allowed (*Gone with the Wind* 842).

Gordon's discomfort came somewhat close to public revelation before an 1871 Congressional investigating committee. Called to testify about his knowledge and possible participation of the Klan in Georgia in the years following the war, Eckert and Trelease explain that despite five hours of answering questions "on conditions in his native state," these Washington elected officials "learned few specifics" from the General (145; 74). If those same congressmen had known for what to listen, however, they would have actually heard about a great many "specifics" (145). As Eckert describes the scene:

When asked directly what he knew of illegal organizations known as the Ku Klux, Gordon denied all knowledge of any combination by the name, except what he had read in the papers or heard secondhand. He did, however, reveal his association with a secret organization whose sole purpose, he maintained, was the preservation of peace (146).

Since Gordon's definition of "peace," as it did for many other white Southerners in the immediate postwar years, had something to do with restoring, minus the legal institution of slavery, a hegemonic power in their relationships with black people, his description of the organization's purpose to which he belonged is exceptionally suggestive (Levine 295-299; 146; Trelease xxxiii; 16). Gordon continued, as Eckert reports his testimony, by relating that upon being "approached by some of Georgia's most-respected men, he joined this 'brotherhood of property-holders, the peaceable, law-abiding citizens of the State for self-protection' from the threat posed by the black population that he thought was largely ignorant" (147; qtd. 147). Trelease adds that General Gordon also admitted that these same "most respected [and] law-abiding citizens" had offered him the office "of state commander" and that, if needed, he "'could be called upon if it was necessary'" (qtd. 74). Explaining "that he had personally 'never entertained toward the negro race anything but the very kindest feelings,' General Gordon blamed "the influx of 'carpetbaggers' and their seditious influence upon blacks that caused the South to act" (147; qtd. 147). Once again, by separating "'blacks'" from the "'South,'" General Gordon created verbal distinctions that reflected existing cultural fissures between former slaves and their white fellows with whom they had shared land since 1619 (147; qtd. 147; Fehrenbacher 11). Such fissures, accentuated even further by Gordon's specific designation of the term "'men'" in reference to those white males who approached him to join and lead their fraternal organization, all too easily came to be orally associated with how much of the white South, and particularly the Klan, came to understand the cultural function of "citizen" for, at the least, almost eighty years after Appomattox (qtd. 147; 147; Trelease 74; *Gone with the Wind* 842; *The Leopard's Spots* 442; "Forrest's Last Charge" 308; 315).

Within such a context, Mitchell's description of the relationship between General Gordon as a "loved and honored citizen" and his leadership of the Georgia Klan becomes quite apparent (*Gone with the Wind* 842; Eckert 145; Trelease 74). Given the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, the implicit conditions for Southern states to attain final readmission into the Union, and the logical consequences in terms of racial as well as social equality, a curious relationship poses itself between these factors and the Klan (Fehrenbacher 580-582). Mixed further into these dynamics was the added feature of white masculinity and its presumed role as the protector of fragile Southern womanhood from the advances of "semi-barbaric" black men (*The Leopard's Spots* 446; 435). As India Wilkes' earlier statement to Scarlett that proudly connects the manhood of "Mr. [Frank] Kennedy, [her brother] Ashley, and all [the others] we know" with their

membership in the Klan, it strongly suggests not just a broad social link, but a specific code with certain connotations that were well known under a given set of circumstances (*Gone with the Wind* 798).

These links and connotations were not unique to Mitchell. In his Klan trilogy, and especially its first installment, *The Leopard's Spots: A Romance of the White Man's Burden* (1900), Dixon creates the same circulating connections between white southern citizenship, masculinity and a cultural relationship to the Klan. From an early reference to "the wisdom of the ages" suggesting the impossibility of "organizing this wrecked society and marshalling into efficient citizenship this band of ignorant negroes" through Charlie Gaston's speech before the Democratic party's assembly, Dixon repeatedly uses the word "citizen" in ways that hint toward a living relationship with masculinity and the membership in the Klan (*The Leopard's Spots* 35; 49; 104; 442). Not in every usage, of course, but with repeated instances, Dixon creates the picture that while black Americans are finally recognized as five-fifths of a person under the Thirteenth Amendment, only whites (and males at that) are citizens capable of enjoying political and social equality (Fehrenbacher 580; Goodwin 686). That Dixon places the climax of Charlie's speech, with its call for "citizen kings," simultaneous to a march of "five thousand white men dressed in scarlet shirts [riding] silently through the streets," and the restitution of civil order by subsequently instilling enough fear into "six thousand negroes," Gaston's coming election as governor does not seem to be an accident of either melodramatic writing or creative historiography (*The Leopard's Spots* 446; 462-465).

Dixon's final two novels of the trilogy, *The Clansman* and *The Traitor*, continue this relationship, but do so in both less, and yet also more overt, ways. Even as he openly dedicates *The Clansman* to his uncle, Colonel Leroy McAfee, "Grand Titan of the Invisible Empire Ku Klux Klan," the use of "citizen" decreases throughout this second novel (n.p.; 46; 155). Even more interestingly, Dixon describes the portrayal of the Klan's origins within the first five years after Appomattox rather than the thirty-five-year timespan of its predecessor. Rather than, in short, offering a grand sweep of the postwar South, *The Clansman* rigidly focuses upon the rise of Ben Cameron as chief of the Klan who realizes his postwar call to rescue Anglo-Saxon civilization (296-342). At the same time, Dixon happily reunites North and South through the marriages of Margaret Cameron to Phil Stoneman and Elsie Stoneman to Ben Cameron (362-374). Given that these Northerners were children of the most radical advocate of full equality, Senator Horace Stoneman, was all the better (41-55). It is the fewer instances of "citizen," however, and especially its virtual absence from the final half of *The Clansman* and its portrayal of the Klan's crusade, that suggest yet something more beyond its literal presence (46; 253). While certainly beyond final awareness, it does seem all too interesting that within Dixon's trilogy, as the Klan gains public acceptance, the more its coded signals seem to vanish into the night. Dixon, in short, appears to be creating the image that once the Klan has reasserted the appropriate social order with itself as first among "citizen kings," no essential need exists to speak or write in code (*The Leopard's Spots* 442; 446). Perhaps that is why Dixon, on the dedicatory page to *The Traitor* in 1907, bluntly links "the men of the South" with their "Service as Citizens of the Invisible Empire" (n.p.). Such an almost open admission of the relationship between Klan membership and the status of citizenship becomes impossible to ignore.

In her exploration of how the North dealt with victory after the Civil War, historian Nina Silber argues that the majority of its people soon developed a form of historical “amnesia” (4). Ignoring Frederick Douglass’ persistent efforts that the North “remember the causes and lessons” of 1861-1865, Silber argues that the feelings of these Yankees were encapsulated by remarks within the Trenton (New Jersey) *State Gazette* in 1882: “[t]he past is dead. Let us live in the present and act the part of men” (qtd. 4). As Dixon and Mitchell all too obviously make clear, however, white Southerners were anything but willing to forget their “past,” to the extent of Faulkner’s famous statement that, unlike the *State Gazette*’s proclamation, it was nowhere near “dead” or even “past” (*The Clansman* 292; *Gone with the Wind* 745; qtd. in Silber 4; qtd. in Chadwick 15). Within the living revision of an un-dead history, the existence of some link between the white South, the Klan and “citizen” formed a socio-cultural matrix that gained an immense power that lasted for decades yet to come (Silber 5; *Gone with the Wind* 841-842; *The Leopard’s Spots* 442; “Forrest’s Last Charge” 308; 315; Mills xvii-xviii).

In the white South of the post-bellum era, Irvin S. Cobb, by virtue of his childhood during the immediate aftermath of the war and a love of history nurtured from that early age, came to use fiction as a means to expose, then undermine, that interlocking matrix of signifiers (Lawson 14; 1; Chatterton 6; 2; 7-10). Despite proclamations at the time of Cobb’s death in 1944 that his fiction was already “out of date” and how he has been almost forgotten by critics over the last several generations, his knowledge and literary portrayal of cultural history suggests the manner by which he linked the post-bellum South, the rise of the Klan, and the ways in which “citizen” served as a code to explain the relationships of each to the Lost Cause itself (Chatterton 131; “Forrest’s Last Charge” 308; 315). In itself, Cobb’s story, entitled “Forrest’s Last Charge,” relates events that surround the misunderstanding between a group of non-English speaking Italian workers sent from Chicago and a segment of local residents in Fairfield (280-323). Given that the Italian workers were Northern, Roman Catholic, and could not understand English, they were, Cobb hints, already culturally suspect in the eyes of many among Fairfield’s homegrown, Southern, and mostly Protestant population (285; 293; 292-293; Noll 17-18). Such already heightened tension created circumstances that led the stabbing death of one local by the hands of an Italian man resulting in a desire for extra-legal violence throughout much of Fairfield. Within short order, these circumstances came to the attention of Judge Priest (“Forrest’s Last Charge” 301; 306-310).

Presiding over a regular meeting of the Gideon K. Irons Encampment late of Forrest’s cavalry, Judge Priest and his fellow veterans were informed of the events then taking place at the banks of the Ohio River. Reacting, as he always did to violations of “the law,” Judge Priest rallied the aging troops, brought up needed reinforcements and marched through the snow to stand literally between the local “mob” and the Italian working “men” (“The Mob from Massac” 268; “Forrest’s Last Charge” 306; 310-313; 316). That order is peacefully resolved, however, does not reflect the complexity of Cobb’s story. Especially with references to his use of “citizen” in specific conjunction with previous military service, and how Cobb pointedly refers to the gathering reactionary locals not as “men,” but as an “armed mob,” he not only understood the Klan’s use of language, but that he also meant to undercut it (306; 308; 315; 314; 316; 318). It is subsequently no accident that throughout his story, Cobb describes the Italian workers as “men” even as he couches, for example, his terminology within the expected references to “overallled, tall and swarthy Latins” (291). They may be, as one of Cobb’s sentences explicitly puts it, “tall and

swarthy," but they are "tall and swarthy men" (291). Such a contrast between a locally "armed mob" and foreign-born "men," published only a year after the release of Griffith's film, also seems anything but accidental (318; 313; Stokes 3; Wells 112).

The notion of an "armed mob" of white locals placed against the picture of "the man" who led the visiting workers and even "the man" guilty of the stabbing in order to protect the one roof over the heads of his fellows, suggests keen understanding of the relationship earlier referenced by Dixon and later echoed by Mitchell ("Forrest's Last Charge" 306; 313; 318-319; *The Leopard's Spots* 442; *Gone with the Wind* 798; 841-842). That Cobb also portrays Judge Priest and his fellows as veterans of General Forrest's cavalry, while again a seeming homage to the one whom many at the time believed was the greatest Confederate soldier from the Western theatre, actually subverts the Lost Cause's raising of Forrest to the highest pantheon of post-Appomattox Southern heroes (309; Rasmussen 167). For despite the well-known white (and even some black) recognition that General Forrest had repudiated the Klan's escalating violence in the late 1860s, and had subsequently spent his remaining life in promoting some form of racial reconciliation, there was no escaping his service as the first Imperial Wizard of the Klan, its tactics of intimidation, violence and, if one will, use of "mob rule" (Hurst 361-368; *The Leopard's Spots* 446; "The Mob from Massac" 258-259; "Forrest's Last Charge" 318-319). By having Judge Priest make reference to the absolute sanctity of "the law" and by placing him, as here, in circumstances where his life is at risk to uphold it, Cobb is condemning not only violence, but quite possibly, even the Lost Cause itself ("The Mob from Massac" 268; "Forrest's Last Charge" 307). When Judge Priest, standing with his fellows squarely between the lines of the white "mob" and the Italian working men, announces to his "Feller citizens ... this is part of Forrest's cavalry [and] [w]e done solderin' onct and we turned soldiers ag'in," his words, unlike those of Dixon and Mitchell, become those of inclusion, tolerance, respect and community ("Forrest's Last Charge" 315; *Gone with the Wind* 841-842; *The Leopard's Spots* 442). Within the present environment, and notwithstanding earlier questions concerning the Constitutional legitimacy of President Chester Arthur, as well as regarding the present claims of more than a few present-day Americans who question the citizenship of the current President, it is those values that constitute not only the meaning of "citizen," but of human as well (Howe 5-6; Wisckol, Martin. "O.C. Suspicions Over Obama's Citizenship Continue." *The Orange County Register*. 27 Oct., 2008).

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THE FILIBUSTER IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE

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First and foremost, the filibuster as it is known in the United States Senate is one of the most unique methods of coercion within the U.S. Congress's arsenal of rules and tools. During a debate regarding legislation, any one senator can bring progress to a complete stop for as long as he or she can stand and speak. The filibuster creates a situation in which just one senator out of one hundred can impede the forward movement of legislation by simply talking. This process embodies the spirit of democracy, especially the notion that the protection of minority opinions is valued. It even holds a sense of equality with regard to every member of the Senate having a voice with which to express their ideas and arguments. Though the filibuster remains, in some minds, the most crucial and useful tool that the Senate's members have at their disposal, there are still rules for using it and bringing it to an end. A rule called "cloture" does not come easily or quickly, however.

The filibuster is, according to Koger (2010), defined as "legislative behavior (or a threat of such behavior) intended to delay a collective decision for strategic gain" (p. 16). Over time, the filibuster has become utilized with more frequency. The reasoning behind the application of the filibuster on the Senate floor is also not what it once was. There were starry-eyed youths in the twentieth century who ached in their bones to become great politicians of character who would fight for the people and communities at home. *Mr. Smith Goes to Washington* made sure of this when Jimmy Stewart was portrayed in the 1939 film as a man sent to replace a senator who had recently died. The filibuster is Mr. Smith's "good fight," though he is out of his element on the Senate floor. Furthermore, the outcome is something of a win for Mr. Smith, the unlikely politician, as a scandal involving money for a dam was uncovered by the end of the film. This dream of being a person who literally stands up for a cause he or she believes in is not always the way in which senators use the filibuster.

The Filibuster: A History

Though the Senate established its procedural rules in 1789, the filibuster did not come about until 1806 when those procedures were reworked. Vice President Aaron Burr in 1805 suggested that the Senate's rules were somewhat redundant and confusing, especially regarding "the previous question" motion. This procedure essentially leads to the ending of a debate and the moving on to a vote on a bill. After doing away with the motion in 1806, the rules of the Senate were left bereft of language to restrict the length of a senator's debate, and the filibuster was accidentally born. The House of Representatives never changed its previous question motion and thus representatives are able to end debate with nothing more than a simple majority. Consequently, the filibuster exists only in one house of the U.S. Congress (Gold and Gupta, 2008).

Though the filibuster was a possibility by 1806, it was not until January 1837 that it was first put into practice. Having been censured for withdrawing deposits from the Bank of the United States, then-President Andrew Jackson and his enthusiastic supporters were determined to remove the censure from the Senate *Journal*. Gold and Gupta (2008) describe the preparations made by the

hopeful senators readying themselves for the first filibuster and, ahead of time, made provisions for a lengthy stay in the Senate chamber. The first Senate filibuster, however, succeeded in accomplishing what it set out to do in a short amount of time. This move would not be the last time that a filibuster was used effectively in reaching a political goal.

Eighty years after the first filibuster was conducted in 1837, President Woodrow Wilson claimed that filibuster reform was necessary in the future. During his time in office and before the United States entered World War I, President Wilson supported a continued neutral stance in the war. However, when Germany began practicing unrestricted submarine warfare, Wilson saw the need to protect U.S. ships and sailors (Shaheen, 2013). Before the United States entered World War I, President Wilson put forth a measure that would keep the United States out of the war and allow it to maintain its status as a neutral party. This measure was in keeping with his reelection speeches and his one-line campaign slogan, "He Kept Us out of War." This proposal, known as the Armed Ship Bill, was designed to arm merchant ships potentially at risk of being attacked by German submarines. It was an acceptable solution for the majority of U.S. House of Representatives members as well as the majority of senators. However, Senator Robert La Follette (R-WI) and other members of the Senate obstructed a vote on the bill. Senator La Follette and ten other isolationists filibustered with only twenty-six hours left in the Sixty-Fourth Congress (Koger, 2010). When that particular Congress's term ended, it had not enacted the legislation that would have armed the merchant ships and possibly helped to keep the United States out of the war a little while longer, if not completely. This filibuster was not only surprising to the American public at the time, but also to those senators who witnessed it. In fact, a situation arose that could have led to violence. Some of the filibuster proponents accused the presiding officer of only recognizing senators who opposed it. Moreover, many of Senator La Follette's constituents were not happy with his act of rebellion. Similarly, some students attending the University of Illinois hanged one of the state's senators in effigy to express their disdain for his support of the filibuster. Consequently, after the Sixty-Fourth Congress had ended, President Wilson declared that the U.S. Senate was in desperate need of filibuster reform, and eventually, the ninety-six senators obtained it (Gold and Gupta, 2008).

During the first special session of the Sixty-Fifth Congress, Senator Thomas Walsh (D-MT), perhaps inadvertently, forced the establishment of cloture in regard to the filibuster. He did this by using the U.S. Constitution. Because a minority in the Senate had previously gotten away with preventing any vote to be taken on changing rules, Senator Walsh claimed, in essence, that every new Congress had the right to be free from the rules established by prior Congresses. Furthermore, the Senate, under Article 1, Section 5 of the U.S. Constitution, had the ability to pass rules for its own governance by a simple majority vote (Koger, 2006).

Senator Warren G. Harding (R-OH) opposed the precedents that Senator Walsh's proposal would establish. As a result, the Republicans and Democrats agreed to appoint five senators from each party to mediate an end to the filibuster reform issue. This action led to a compromise between the two parties on a "cloture rule," that is, a procedure to restrict the length of debate on a pending issue. In Rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, any measure could be limited for debate with two-thirds of all senators voting. This compromise proved a sufficient answer to the filibuster reform problem as it passed the Senate by the vote of 76-3 on March 8, 1917 (Gold and Gupta, 2008).

Cloture was, therefore, established in 1917 with Senate Rule XXII. A couple of decades later, in 1948, some senators found a loophole to exploit in the previous compromise. Language in Senate Rule XXII implied that only pending measures brought forth for a debate and vote were subject to the cloture rule. It created the inference that filibustering prior to the Senate agreeing to enter into debate on specific legislation was a possibility. At the time, President Pro-Tempore Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI) made this loophole an official rule. This provision effectively made the previous 1917 cloture compromise a weak, moot conclusion. Vandenberg's decision was overruled briefly by Vice President Alben Barkley, but by a 46-41 vote the Senate reestablished Vandenberg's ruling (Gold and Gupta, 2008).

Further changes to the Senate's Rule XXII were proposed by Senator Kenneth Wherry (R-NE) on March 17, 1949. His amendment would have changed the language of the previous cloture rule as well as the implications of subsequent rule changes in the Senate. The amendment allowed that Rule XXII could be implemented in debates regarding treaties, motions to proceed, and even nominations brought to the U.S. Senate chamber for confirmation. But motions to change Senate rules would not be subject to cloture. Furthermore, the Wherry Amendment allowed for a minimum of two-thirds of Senators present at the vote to enforce cloture. This method of invoking cloture had a short life. Soon after it was cut from the bill, the usage of the filibuster increased. The changes that came about during the era of the civil rights movement were not passed without opposition in the form of many hours of filibustering.

Many books and articles that discuss the topic of the filibuster mention the one conducted by Senator Strom Thurmond (D-SC) in 1957. Holding a minority position in the Senate, Thurmond and his fellow southern Democrats among other opponents of civil rights legislation used the filibuster often for their cause. Between 1890 and 1975, several senators attempted to pass legislation that would improve the social situation of African Americans across the United States. This legislation included bills opposing lynching, poll taxes, and race discrimination. In the midst of all of the filibustering performed by the southern Democrats (and a few Republicans) in opposition to the Civil Rights Act of 1957, Thurmond delivered the longest filibuster ever to take place in the Senate. The Senator from South Carolina held the Senate floor, with a bucket posted inside a broom closet for when nature inevitably called, for what would be a twenty-four hour and eighteen minute-long filibuster (Secretary of the Senate, 2011). His physician's concern over a kidney condition he had was what finally forced him to stop his filibuster. Though this remains the lengthiest of all filibusters, it did not succeed in blocking the Civil Rights Act of 1957, which passed regardless of the history Thurmond made attempting to block it (Gold and Gupta, 2008).



After Senator Thurmond's display of opposition to the legislation, the Senate eventually came around to the constitutional issue once again in 1959. Though almost every time the option has arisen in the past, a majority of senators has not been inclined to implement it. This position was not true with 1959's Eighty-Sixth Congress. At the time, even Vice President Richard Nixon put his stamp of approval on the constitutional option. Then-Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson (D-TX) was one of the senators who opposed it. Consequently, Johnson helped the chamber to arrive at a compromise resolution. This compromise allowed for cloture to be invoked on any motion by a vote of two-thirds of all senators present in the chamber (Gold and Gupta, 2008).

By resorting back to the old method of invoking cloture with two-thirds of all senators present and in favor of doing so, the Senate experienced the most flagrant use of the filibuster for almost two months in the winter and spring of 1960. The filibuster would ultimately end, but only after wasting 157 hours and 26 minutes of debate time. The filibuster reform that followed fifteen years later was significant compared to reform passed in the years prior to 1975. During that year liberals as well as both party leaders supported filibuster reform and passed a compromise resolution that allowed cloture to be invoked by a vote in the affirmative from only three-fifths of all senators and not only the ones present at the time of the vote. An additional caveat of change in the modus operandi of the filibuster in 1975 was the introduction of what is referred to as the two-track system (Gold and Gupta, 2008).

Prior to the filibuster reform implemented in 1975, any senator wanting to filibuster had to do so knowing well that every potential item of business would be put on hold. In 1975, due to efforts put forth by Majority Whip Robert Byrd (D-WV), the two-track system was created. This system was developed so that the possibility of halting all progress in working on legislation in the Senate was gone. Essentially, by 1977, invoking cloture meant these things for senators who were filibustering: they had only one hour left to speak, and the topic of their speech was required to be germane to the initial purpose of the filibuster (Gold and Gupta, 2008).

The Contemporary Filibuster

The procedures directing business as conducted in the U.S. Senate come from its standing rules and special and standing orders. The Senate also is governed by precedents set in past decisions that it has made on procedural questions (Shaheen, 2013). For lawmakers in the Senate of 2015, ending a filibuster means either entering a motion to table a pending issue with a simple majority thereby effectively killing the potential law, or acquiring a three-fifths vote in the affirmative from all members of the Senate for cloture. Senate Rule XXII requires that two calendar days must pass between at least sixteen senators filing for cloture and three-fifths voting to invoke the procedure. Even after cloture is invoked, the filibustering senator still is granted an additional thirty hours of debate so long as it is germane or relevant to the topic of the filibuster's purpose. Aside from these details, because of the two-track system, a standing filibuster is no longer necessary. Due to the 1975 change in Senate rules, a unanimous consent of senators is required to move forward to other measures and issues while the filibuster is left on the back burner and cloture is slowly invoked (Shaheen, 2013). According to Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), in 2013, many opportunities existed for senators to filibuster bills in the "greatest deliberative body" (p. 3) in the world. A senator can filibuster a substitute amendment, a motion to proceed, and the final passage of a bill. Moreover, three additional opportunities are possible for a senator to filibuster, and they can occur while Senate leadership arrives at a committee of conference with the House

of Representatives. The ability of one single senator to obstruct the passage of legislation or the confirmation of a federally appointed official is clearly enormous in scope.

Evidence exists that a great number of senators, both past and present, agree that the power to filibuster is constitutionally legal. Some, however, oppose this theory. This opposition refers primarily to the contemporary filibuster procedure and cloture as well. Due to the fact that the use of the filibuster has grown in frequency, this argument merits examination. In fact, according to Chafetz (2011), invoking cloture has become the “de facto requirement” to pass any substantial piece of legislation in the U.S. Senate (p. 1008). The filibuster today is used at the whim of any senator and for any cause; this move is unlike the days previous to 1949 when the filibuster was utilized and applied only to important legislation. Furthermore, Chafetz (2011) notes the exponential growth in the frequency that cloture has been invoked. The two greatest increases in frequency took place between 1959 and 1979, and 1989 and 2009. Cloture was invoked, respectively, twenty-nine and ninety-four times.

This trend of increased filibuster and cloture rule usage has been attributed to a few possible factors. The first is the decrease in the number of moderate or bi-partisan senators. Over the past several years especially, the ideological lines drawn between the Republican and Democratic parties have become more discernible and deeply embedded. This division affects the likelihood of compromise on legislation as the respective politicians of each major party remain strictly aligned with their ideological bases (Chafetz, 2011). Some speculation on the change between the two major political parties in U.S. history show that the personal relationships between the individual members and their respective families have waned. At one time in the Senate’s history, many politicians made their homes in and near Washington, D.C., out of convenience. They also spent leisure time with one another, building close, personal relationships. Still others, like former Senator Judd Gregg (R-NH), believe that the divisive, ideological attitudes and practices of lawmakers in the Senate can be attributed to the previous areas of political work from which almost half of today’s senators have come. Settings like the House of Representatives, unlike governorships, do not find as many opportunities to work with the opposing political party. They have been trained, in a manner of speaking, to represent the political team for which they have been elected to work. In fact, this sort of behavior has become so regularly accepted as business-as-usual that many observers assume that both the majority and minority will do what is in their power to obstruct the opposing side in their legislative endeavors. Instead of debates, discussions, and compromises taking place in the appropriate places (i.e., committee meeting rooms), deliberations are occurring inside of the offices of the U.S. Senate leadership. This is where they work on concluding the invoking of cloture to overcome the ever-impending filibuster (Shaheen, 2013).

Another factor, which is unexpectedly beneficial for senators, is the use of the two-track system. Since this particular method of handling the filibuster came about in the 1970s, the overall cost of the filibuster has dropped. The legislation of interest during a filibuster can essentially be held on the side until the opponents of the filibuster have established their sixty percent of the votes to invoke cloture. This is where many people get the idea that the Senate needs sixty percent to pass legislation normally as opposed to the constitutionally mandated majority. In addition to the decrease in fiduciary requirements in filibustering, the physical exertion once required by a senator or senators is no longer a necessity either, making for an easy filibuster (Chafetz, 2011).

One member of Congress, Senator William Proxmire (D-WI), who holds the record for the fifth-longest filibuster in history, found that the financial impact of filibustering can be important in the eyes of the taxpayers, regardless of the intentions and motivations behind the act. Senator Proxmire spent an entire night on September 28, 1981, filibustering against an increase to the public debt ceiling to an amount beyond one trillion dollars (Senate Historical Office, 2009). This conflict begs the question: what is the cost of a night in the Senate chamber compared to a debt of one trillion dollars?

Official Opinions of the Filibuster

The most pervasive argument against the current state of the filibuster is that it represents an effective barrier to much of the legislation that is brought up for debate on the Senate floor. Even with the advent of the two-track method, filibustering—and the filing, voting, and invoking of cloture—still takes up valuable time from the senators who want to pass legislation. As Senator Shaheen points out in her essay (2013), some continuing legislation such as the National Defense Authorization Act and specific appropriations bills are crucial and necessary to perpetuate government activity. Without the passage of these bills, appropriations would expire, leaving the government to flounder and cease to work. In essence, Chafetz (2011) points out that the minority not only has had its rights protected, but it has gone beyond that as well. The minority, therefore, does not necessarily act as a minority with its ability to filibuster an issue.

Regarding historical filibusters which have taken up valuable Senate time and, in some cases, taxpayer dollars, a small number of significantly lengthy speeches have taken place. Aside from the speech given for a little over twenty-four hours by South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond in 1957, a few others have come close to breaking his record. Early filibusters were, however, about attrition. If a senator could wear down his opponents on a bill or an issue and force them to compromise or give in to his own will, then the use of the respective filibuster could produce a victory. Traditionally, the filibuster was intended to be used in this way.

Coming close to Senator Thurmond's record-long filibuster speech was former Senator Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY). Not only does Senator D'Amato own the second-longest filibuster in Senate history, but also the seventh. His longest filibuster was conducted in 1986 when, in opposition to a military spending bill, he read the Washington, D.C. telephone book. This filibuster endured for twenty-three hours and thirty minutes. Later on, in 1992, Senator D'Amato conducted a filibuster which lasted for fifteen hours and fourteen minutes. This time he was speaking out in protest of 800 jobs at a typewriter factory being taken out of New York State and deported to



Mexico (Senate Historical Office, 1992). During this particular filibuster he shouted about trade issues and even sang a song. A newspaper headline from October 7, 1992, the day after the filibuster, read: "Windy but Proud, D'Amato Sings for Jobs" (Bradsher, 1992). The one item of business that Senator D'Amato accomplished with this noteworthy filibuster was his own reelection to the U.S. Senate by the people of New York. Though this display of dedication sat well with the voters of New York, Thomas Jefferson might have felt differently about it.

As Chafetz notes (2011), Jefferson, as vice president and president pro-tempore from 1797 to 1801, thought that talking on a topic which had no relevance to the issue being debated created disorder. Jefferson even went so far as to say that a senator choosing to act in such a way could be taken out of the chamber if he was so determined to continue behaving in a disorderly fashion. Legitimacy and germaneness seem to have been of the utmost importance to some of the earliest Senate members. Even Alexander Hamilton, according to Koger (2011), in Federalist Paper Number 22, discussed the issue of a supermajority requirement under the Articles of Confederation and referred to it as a means of obliterating the energy of the government in general. Hamilton also saw this requirement of a supermajority for the passage of legislation as catering somewhat to those of the fringes on both the left and right, thereby abating the true ability of democracy by hindering the decision of the majority.

Though the passage of legislation within the Senate does not require that sixty percent of senators place a vote in favor of a bill, many people view the current state of rules on filibustering as creating a paradox wherein the passage does in fact require at least sixty of one hundred senators to vote in favor of a bill. This de facto impact of the filibuster is arguably unconstitutional. In addition to this subsequent effect, the conspicuous and blatant polarization of both political parties emphasizes this perversion of the Senate deliberation process. To an unbiased observer, the whole process of filibustering makes being a part of one of the most impressive legislative bodies in the world look like simply a game of spite and ego. What this causes is attrition of the moderate voters in the respective states' constituencies and eventually, ennui toward our previously highly respected legislative body. Perhaps the difference in today's Senate and the one which Hamilton and Jefferson observed in their time is found in the modification of the Seventeenth Amendment. During the Progressive Era the way in which senators were elected to office was altered. Before May 31, 1913, each state legislature chose their state's two senators. After this modification of Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution, the citizens of each state were given the right to elect their senators, further democratizing the people's ability to participate in federal politics.

Within five years after the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment, the Senate devised a method by which to vote to invoke cloture. In fact, according to Koger (2011), though the Senate saw a rise in filibustering during the early twentieth century, it was not until the 1960s and an increase in the popularity of civil rights issues that the Senate invoked cloture more frequently. This period marked a conspicuous change in the way American politics within the U.S. Senate were conducted. Interestingly, Koger (2006) also relates the change in the usage of cloture to the rise of filibustering and the decrease of attrition as a method of obtaining victory for legislation. What's more, contemporary Senate members have not shown much interest in changing the processes that hinder productive deliberation and possible passage of legislation. Something about a simple majority vote on an issue does not seem to entice senators into reforming the system, regardless of the obstruction to legislative progress.

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OVERVIEW OF OKLAHOMA TAX POLICY

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At every level of government, tax policies are among the most controversial. Liberals and conservatives hold very different ideas on what constitutes “good tax policy.” The rhetoric expressed by both sides can leave the average voter confused and no more informed than before hearing the predictable sound bites from public officials. Like many political topics, the truth lies somewhere in the middle. This is certainly true in Oklahoma, as Governor Mary Fallin and the Republicans push for cutting the individual income tax rate while simultaneously acknowledging that there is a sizeable shortage in the budget; and therefore are also recommending cuts to various public programs in the state. Not surprisingly this has drawn sharp criticism from not only Democrats, but also some Republicans.

Ask any taxpayer about their thoughts on tax policy, and their response will likely be that they pay too much, while everyone else needs to pay “their fair share.” However, very few people are willing to define what constitutes a “fair share.” Due to the complexity of tax codes, and economic policies in general, it can be very difficult to become well educated on tax policies.

To understand truly the debate regarding Oklahoma’s individual income tax rates, one must consider several factors. First, a standard should be established for what constitutes “good tax policy.” Secondly, one should also have a basic understanding of both the current and proposed income tax policies. And finally, the arguments of the left and right should be scrutinized with as little bias as possible. When reading or listening to these political arguments, many valid issues will come up such as budget constraints, education funding, and transportation funding. Though the focus has been on the individual income tax rate, other taxes for Oklahoma cannot be ignored either. Sales taxes, excise taxes, corporate income taxes, and property taxes are also important for state revenue.

It is also important to continue the policy analysis beyond the borders of Oklahoma. A state’s tax policy can have positive and negative consequences regarding its competitiveness for business and economic growth. Economists refer to this as the “business tax climate” of a state, and it can have a major impact regarding the tax revenue a state receives. When comparing Oklahoma’s tax policies to other states, it will become apparent that the state’s tax policy must be dynamic over the long run in order to avoid losing tax revenue, regardless of the tax rates. After these issues have been considered, only then can policy makers consider the various options while drafting tax reform bills.

Policy planning of any type should be guided by a set of standards or principles. These can be quantitative, qualitative, or both. The Tax Foundation has established a set of principles that it believes sets the foundation for sound tax policies. These principles are as follows: simplicity, transparency, neutrality, stability, no retroactivity, and broad bases and low rates. Simplicity reduces administrative costs and the incentive to hide income. Transparency allows taxpayers to understand tax policies through open exchange between the taxpayer and tax collector – in this

case the state. The principle of neutrality establishes that the tax system should not favor some industries, activities, or products over another. The principle of stability makes it easier for long-range financial planning, which can apply to both the taxpayers and the state. No retroactivity allows for stability and confidence that the law will not change from when contracts were originally signed. Finally, the principle of broad bases and low rates states that lawmakers should avoid allowing deductions and credits to certain industries or businesses. As a result, more revenue can be raised with lower average tax rates (Drenkard, 2013, Introduction). While these principles are somewhat subjective, they do provide some basic guidelines to state legislatures when creating tax policies. It is in the interest of each state to adhere to these principles as much as possible.

Oklahoma's tax policies are easily accessible to the public through the Oklahoma Tax Commission's Website at www.tax.ok.gov. This site provides forms for filing taxes, as well as Frequently Asked Questions pages for each type of tax. There really is not any reason for the average Oklahoma taxpayer to claim ignorance on Oklahoma's tax policies. Combine the information provided by the Oklahoma Tax Commission Website with information provided by the Oklahoma Legislature's Website (www.oklegislature.gov) and the media, then no surprises regarding tax legislation in the state should arise.

In Oklahoma, there are seven tax brackets. Current tax laws have the lowest bracket paying 0.5 percent on taxable income from \$0-\$1,000 for those who are single or married with each spouse filing separately. For married couples filing jointly, the rate is 0.5 percent on taxable income from \$0-\$2,000 dollars. Conversely, single taxpayers or married taxpayers filing separately pay 5.25 percent on taxable income over \$8,700, while married couples filing jointly pay 5.25 percent on taxable income over \$15,000 (Oklahoma Tax Commission [OTC], 2014).

It does not take much for Oklahomans to reach the top tax bracket. If using the standard deductions, single taxpayers and married taxpayers filing separate returns can take the standard deduction of \$6,200 in the fiscal year 2014, while a jointly filed tax return for married couples allows for a standard deduction of \$12,400. This means that taxpayers filing single or separate returns only need an income over \$14,900 to move into the highest tax bracket, while taxpayers filing joint returns need a combined income over \$27,400 to be in the highest bracket (OTC, 2014). According to the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, about 56 percent of Oklahomans are in the top tax bracket (as cited by Oklahoma Policy Institute, *Income Tax Basics*, 2011).

Reducing the state income tax has been a goal of Governor Fallin for most, if not all, of her time in office. She has stated in the past that her long-term goal is for a complete elimination of the individual income tax. That plan met with stiff resistance, so that her administration has gone for a more gradual approach to reducing the individual income tax. In 2013, the Oklahoma House and Senate passed HB 2032, which was then signed into law by Governor Fallin. According to Randy Ellis of *The Oklahoman*, the law had a provision to cut the top income tax rate from 5.25 percent to 5.0 percent on January 1, 2015. There was an additional provision to cut the top rate to 4.85 percent in 2016 if revenue growth for the 2016 fiscal year was at least the fiscal impact of the 0.15 percentage cut. The law also provided for 120 million dollars over two years to repair the capitol building. In December 2013, the Oklahoma Supreme Court unanimously ruled the

law as unconstitutional, because it violated a provision of the state constitution that requires that bills only include a single subject to prevent log rolling (2013).

The legislature quickly went back to work on a new bill. The Senate introduced SB 1246. This bill had many of the same provisions as HB 2032, minus the appropriations for capitol building repairs. According to a recent article in the *Tulsa World*:

SB 1246 will lower the top personal income tax rate from 5.25 percent to 5 percent in January 2016 if the general revenue projection for the budget year beginning in July 2016 exceeds general revenue for the current year. Another revenue increase would trigger a further reduction to 4.85 percent (Krehbiel, 2014).

The bill passed the Senate on February 27, 2014, followed by the House on April 23. On April 28, the governor signed it into law.

The legislation has not been without its critics from both parties in the state. Critics question the wisdom of cutting taxes while the state is already facing budget shortages. According to the Oklahoma Policy Institute, there will be \$188 million less in funds for the 2015 fiscal year (2014). Meanwhile, once the income tax reduction is fully implemented, there will be about \$200 million less in tax revenue (Krehbiel, 2014). This estimate has led to some fears that important departments such as education, transportation, and corrections may face cuts to their budgets. To alleviate some of these concerns, the state could use money from the Rainy Day Fund to offset any short-term revenue losses from a tax cut.

A majority of Republicans in the legislature have used the argument that tax cuts will stimulate the economy. Representative Leslie Osborn (R-Mustang) believes that tax cuts serve to encourage spending by putting more money into circulation. However, all twenty-eight House Democrats voted against the tax cut along with twelve Republicans. Fifty-one votes were required to pass the bill in the House, and it only narrowly passed with a vote of fifty-four to forty (Krehbiel, 2014). This shows that several Republicans also have reservations about the bill.

Regarding Representative Osborn's argument that Oklahomans will have more money to spend, one should consider exactly how much each individual or family will have. With respect to the original bill that was overturned by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, Ellis writes:

The average return would have had an \$82 tax break at the 5 percent maximum tax rate and a \$143 tax break at the 4.85 percent level, but amounts would have varied considerably depending on income, Oklahoma Tax Commission officials have said (2013).

These numbers were broken down even further. Those with taxable income up to \$25,999 would only get about eight dollars in tax savings; those in the \$80,000 to \$99,999 would save about \$108; the \$200,000 to \$499,999 range would save around \$371; and for those earning over one million, the return would average \$1,377 (Ellis, 2013). Opponents of the tax cut could argue that these numbers do not provide that much benefit to the taxpayers. For example, the eight dollar return for those making under \$26,000 will buy them a meal from a fast food restaurant. For individuals in the upper income ranges, those returns may also be of minimal importance. For instance, while a person making \$200,000 to \$499,999 may enjoy a \$371 tax saving every year, will it actually

impact their quality of life or financial decisions? These are fair questions that should be answered when making these types of tax policy decisions.

Spreading those numbers over all of Oklahoma's taxpayers would indicate that a sizable amount of money would be returned to the Oklahoma economy; however, there is a problem with that theory. It assumes that people spend their money in predictable ways. Many taxpayers probably would spend that money on goods and services in the state, but not all taxpayers. With online shopping becoming more prevalent, much of that money could go to companies out of state. Residents living near state borders may spend that money in a city across the state line. Finally, some taxpayers might save the money, effectively keeping that money out of circulation for a significant period of time. All of these factors would reduce the economic benefit to Oklahoma.

This could hurt an already ailing revenue stream. Though state revenue is at an all-time high in nominal dollars, House Minority Leader Scott Inman (D-Del City) points out that "it is \$500 million less than six years ago when adjusted for inflation" (Krehbiel, 2014). Inman continues to state that the governor may push for tax increases in the oil and gas industry to make up for the income tax cut (Krehbiel, 2014).

Inman makes a good point. While the individual income tax has received a bulk of the attention from political leaders and media alike, there are also other important tax issues in the state. Furthermore, cutting one revenue stream may require that the state make up for it elsewhere. The Tax Foundation is a national organization founded in 1937 that compiles tax data from all fifty states. From its information,



one can truly compare what impact a state's tax policy has on its economy and residents. They also provide various tables that rank the states on tax burden for the states' residents, and the revenue obtained through taxes and other means. Their *Facts & Figures* booklet for 2013 shows that Oklahoma's individual income taxes made up 19.5 percent of total revenues for 2010 when both state and local tax revenues are combined (Drenkard, 2013, Table 8). When only state taxes are considered, that percentage for 2010 jumps to 31.4 percent according to the Oklahoma Policy Institute (*Action Items*, 2013, p. 3). Considering that the individual income tax makes up such a large percentage of state revenue, the state should have a backup plan if revenue does not rise as predicted by state Republicans that backed SB 1246.

There is an argument that the oil and gas industry may be a good place to increase revenue for the state. Oklahoma levies a 7.0 percent tax on gross production from oil and gas drilling, but companies get a tax break on wells that use deep drilling or horizontal drilling methods in which they only pay 1.0 percent on gross production of horizontal wells and 4.0 percent on deep wells. This policy was done to help curtail the high costs of these methods when they were in their infancy, but now most new wells in Oklahoma apply these methods. Thus the Oklahoma Policy

Institute argues that it is time to do away with the tax incentives. They also write that gross production taxes on oil and gas provided \$744 million in revenue for the state in fiscal year 2010, accounting for 10.5 percent of all state tax collections. This amount puts oil and gas production taxes in third place behind individual income taxes and sales taxes for state revenue (*Action Items*, 2013, p. 5).

When it comes to state tax policies, no state is completely insulated from the policies enacted by other states. Over the long-term, state tax policies remain a significant factor in business decisions for both large corporations and small business owners. When looking to expand or move operations into a larger market area, business leaders will look at state and local tax policies to try and find a location that will give them a competitive edge by reducing expenses in items such as taxes, wages, and insurance rates. This activity creates competition among the various states regarding policies that could attract certain industries to their states.

The Tax Foundation looks at state and local taxes from a perspective of “tax burden,” rather than “tax collection.” Tax burden concerns how much taxes affect the taxpayers, rather than how much income the state gets from taxes (Malm & Prante, 2014, p. 3). Tax burdens are important for understanding how states compete for tax dollars in building a business climate that is conducive to profit and growth for those businesses. In their research, Malm and Prante find that

State-local tax burdens are very close to one another and slight changes in taxes or income can translate to seemingly dramatic shifts in rank. For example, the twenty mid-ranked states, ranging from Oregon (16th) to Georgie (35th), only differ in burden by just over one percentage point (p. 2).

Therefore it behooves state legislators to understand how much of an impact tax policies can have on strategic planning for industries in their state.

Overall, Oklahoma ranks pretty well in most of the categories of tax burden, but it could do better. The most recent data from the Tax Foundation come from the fiscal year 2011, and it includes data for both state and local tax burdens. Oklahoma’s overall tax burden for 2011 was 8.5 percent of state income, earning the rank of thirty-ninth. For comparison, New York was ranked first, where taxpayers forego an average of 12.6 percent of their income. Wyoming was ranked fiftieth, where they pay an average of only 6.9 percent of their income (Malm and Prante, 2014, p. 6).

How do other states around Oklahoma compare regarding tax burdens? Again, using 2011 data, Arkansas ranks the highest with 10.3 percent tax burden. Kansas carries a 9.4 percent burden, while both Colorado and Missouri have 9.0 percent tax burdens. New Mexico is only slightly higher than Oklahoma at 8.6 percent, and Texas is one full percentage point lower than Oklahoma at 7.5 percent (Malm and Prante, 2014, p. 6).

Though Oklahoma’s tax burden looks competitive overall, some areas could be improved. Sales taxes are a good example. The state sales tax rate is 4.5 percent, and the average local sales tax rate is 4.17 percent. The total average sales tax rate of 8.67 percent brings Oklahoma’s rank to fifth highest sales tax in the nation (Drenkard, 2013, Table 18). This could push businesses and consumers to shop in more sales tax friendly areas or online. A good example of this can be found between Vermont and New Hampshire. Vermont levies a sales tax, while New Hampshire does

not. According to Hal Bundrick in a recent article on www.mainstreet.com, “One study shows that per capita sales in border counties in sales tax-free New Hampshire have tripled since the late 1950s, while per capita sales in border counties in Vermont have remained stagnant” (2014). Fortunately, sales tax rates between Oklahoma and its border states do not vary that much, but Oklahoma’s combined sales tax rates are still higher than the bordering states (Drenkard, 2014, Table 18).

How the sales taxes are structured can be just as important as the rate itself. Many states will either exempt or lower sales tax rates for groceries, since food is a basic necessity for rich and poor alike. Oklahoma does not do this, and neither does Kansas; however, Texas, New Mexico, and Colorado exempt groceries from sales taxes. Arkansas and Missouri tax groceries at a much lower rate (Drenkard, 2013, Table 29). Sales taxes are considered regressive in nature, because the poor and wealthy are taxed at the same rate. Sales taxes on items such as groceries can make more of an impact on the poor than they do on the wealthy.

Many more taxes that states levy, such as excise taxes, inheritance taxes, corporate income taxes, and property taxes, exist. Going into depth of each major tax is beyond the scope of this work. The key idea to take away from them, however, is that when all taxes are combined, they shape the business tax climate of a state. Business tax climate refers to how attractive a location is for a certain business or industry for potential profit and growth. If a state can improve its business tax climate, then it can potentially draw more businesses. More businesses also bring more jobs, resulting in more taxpayers in the state.

Oklahoma does not rank well in business tax climate. While the state ranks well in corporate taxes (12), unemployment insurance tax (2), and property taxes (12), high individual income tax rates (36) and sales taxes (39) bring the overall business tax climate ranking down to thirty-fifth. The surrounding states rank as follows: Arkansas (33), Colorado (18), Kansas (26), Missouri (16), New Mexico (38), and Texas (9). For further reference, Wyoming ranked first, while New York ranked last (Drenkard, 2013, Table 4).

In order to improve the state’s ranking, Oklahoma legislators do not have to reinvent the wheel. All they need to do is look at other states for examples of what to do, and what not to do. Over the last few years, Indiana has proven to be one of the most proactive states in improving its tax climate. A tax bill was passed in 2011 that began a gradual decrease of the corporate income tax from 8.5 percent to 6.5 percent. Additionally, they cut the individual income tax rate and sped up the repeal of the inheritance tax (Drenkard, 2014). In March 2014, the governor signed a tax package to improve the business climate further. Drenkard explains the major components of the tax package:

- Phase down the corporate income tax rate to 4.9 percent by 2022, which would make Indiana’s the second lowest corporate tax rate of any state levying the tax.
- Allow localities the option to enact a business personal property tax filing threshold for businesses with less than \$20,000 in personal property (this threshold is based on acquisition cost of the property).
- Allow localities the option to exempt new property from the business personal property tax.

- Create a designated body that may establish an enhanced personal property abatement schedule on a project-to-project basis.
- Create a business personal property commission of legislators, local officials, and industry representatives to further study business personal property taxes and other business taxes (Drenkard, 2014).

This package gives legislators, local governments, and business officials an even greater stake in the system. If all the entities participate as envisioned, it should help Indiana continue to draft policies that provide the best possible balance between government, business, labor, and consumer interests.

In the same article, Drenkard describes why cutting corporate taxes may be the key to economic growth. For most states, corporate taxes make up a small percentage of tax revenue, and studies show that corporate taxes are very harmful for economic growth (2014). He continues, “economists agree that corporate taxes are ultimately not borne by corporations themselves, but are passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices, workers in the form of lower wages, and shareholders in the form of lower dividends” (2014).

Though Indiana provides an example of good tax policies for economic growth, the opposite could be said of its neighbor, Illinois. Illinois has struggled over the past several years to pay its bills and has consistently failed to balance its budget. In an attempt to rectify this problem, the state increased its flat individual income tax from 3.0 to 5.0 percent, and it increased the corporate income tax from 7.3 to 9.5 percent in 2011. Despite this effort, the \$8.5 billion backlog of unpaid bills grew to nine billion dollars by 2013. By the end of 2013, it fell to \$7.6 billion. This decline is despite the fact that the taxes did increase revenue by about seven to eight billion dollars (Stone, 2014).

Due to the corporate tax increase, several-high profile businesses threatened to leave the state until the legislature offered targeted incentive packages (Stone, 2014). These incentive packages are undoubtedly structured to benefit the large corporations that employ high numbers of workers. The article did not give any details of whether small businesses were extended incentives to stay. Without any additional information, one could assume that some of these smaller businesses may prepare to leave the state if they have the means to move. Others may simply close if the taxes prove to be too much of a burden.

The tax provisions in Illinois had a sunset provision to begin a decrease in taxes in 2015. But with the state still facing large budget shortages, plans are in place to impose a progressive individual income tax. The new tax structure would have seven tax brackets, and the top bracket would have a tax rate of 9.0 percent. This change would require an amendment to the state constitution, which, according to Stone, requires 60 percent approval of the legislators and then a vote by the people (2014).

Stone’s findings are similar to those of Drenkard. Stone writes: “Excessive taxes on income are generally less desirable than taxes on consumption because they discourage wealth creation” (Stone, 2014). A comparison between Oklahoma and Texas may back this claim. Texas tends to have a more robust economy than Oklahoma and a higher standard of living. Texas does not

impose income taxes on individuals or corporations, while Oklahoma taxes both groups. While both states impose property taxes, Texas property taxes comprise 45.2 percent of Texas state and local revenues. Oklahoma's property taxes comprise only 21.1 percent of state and local revenue (Drenkard, 2013, Table 8). In 2011, mean property taxes on owner-occupied housing as a percentage of mean home value was 1.74 percent in Texas. This figure represented the fifth highest home property tax rate in the nation. Meanwhile, Oklahoma's mean property taxes as a percentage of mean home value was only 0.83 percent, making the state thirtieth highest in the nation (Drenkard, 2013, Table 31).

Despite the property taxes being more than double that of Oklahoma, immigration to Texas continues at a much higher rate than Oklahoma. To be fair, important factors other than income taxes attract individuals and businesses to Texas. Texas has a much more diverse economy based partly on the greater diversity of geography and people when compared to Oklahoma. Both states have large and robust agriculture and energy industries, but Texas has several ports on the gulf coast, making it an important state for many manufactured goods and raw materials to be imported and exported. Due largely in part to its size, Texas has many more military installations than Oklahoma and the civilian industries that support those installations. The large border with Mexico provides several government jobs to Texas in the form of customs, border patrol, and immigration agents. The generally mild winters also make Texas more attractive for individuals searching for a good place to live and work.

A state's tax policy not only impacts state revenue, but it can have a significant impact on economic growth. Some economists argue that cutting the marginal income tax rate will encourage workers to work more, because they get to keep a larger percentage of their money earned. In turn, this policy results in an increase of output. Additionally, money saved from lower tax rates can be used for investment (Arnold, 2005, p. 373). Conversely, higher income taxes result in workers having less money to spend. As a result, consumption decreases, as well as aggregate demand (Arnold, 2005, p. 172). If aggregate demand falls, then manufacturers will reduce production accordingly to make supply equal to the reduced demand. In more extreme cases, companies may have to reduce the workforce or hours worked. This move reduces income for both the business and the workers, thus reducing taxable income for the state to collect.

This economic relationship explains why the typical conservative argument that lower taxes can actually create more tax revenue for a state has some validity. This fact can be demonstrated through the use of a Laffer Curve, named for the economist Arthur Laffer. Laffer demonstrated the concept through the use of a line graph. The x-axis represents the tax rate, while the y-axis represents tax revenue collected. There are two points on the graph at which tax revenue will equal zero. Those points are at 0.0 percent tax and 100 percent tax. A 0.0 percent tax obviously results in zero revenue; and at 100 percent tax rate, no one has the incentive to work if all of their income will be taken (Arnold, 2005, p. 259). So, somewhere between those two points is a tax rate at which the state can maximize its tax collections.

Finding that point of maximum revenue can prove very tricky for the state. The formula for tax collections can be expressed as $\text{tax revenues} = \text{tax base} \times \text{tax rates}$. Tax base is defined by Arnold as "the total amount of taxable income" (2005, p. 259). Therefore, a state can actually increase its tax base through lowering corporate and individual income tax rates. Lower taxes can lead to

more people and business relocating to the state and existing people and businesses working harder to earn more money. Thus the state would have more taxable income if either of these conditions occurred. The real question then becomes, as Arnold writes, “*How much* does the tax base expand following the tax rate reduction?” (2005, p. 260).

Because that question can be so difficult to answer, the best action for a state to take might be for a gradual reduction in taxes. Oklahoma’s new tax bill accomplishes that, especially since it contains the provision that the projected revenue after the tax cut must exceed the current revenue. Oklahoma must also remain competitive with other states, or it may risk losing business opportunities to other states with more attractive tax policies. Thus legislators cannot look at Oklahoma as a microcosm of economic activity. They should look to states such as Texas and Indiana for innovative ideas regarding tax policy.

Oklahoma should also consider a reduction to the corporate income tax to help attract new businesses to the state. Naturally, the benefits of tax cuts to state revenue may take time to be realized. Businesses and individuals will need time to adjust their business or spending practices before any real benefit is seen from the state’s point of view. To alleviate the concerns of short-term losses to revenue, especially when facing a budget shortage to begin with, the state should consider a small increase in property taxes to help offset some of the initial revenue losses due to the income tax cuts. As mentioned earlier, Oklahoma could dip into the Rainy Day Fund to help with the immediate budget needs. The state could also end the targeted exemptions to oil and gas producers using horizontal or deep well drilling methods. If all oil and gas producers are paying the same rate for gross production taxes, then the state could afford a slight reduction in gross production tax rates, which follows the Tax Foundation’s principles of “neutrality” and “broad bases and low rates.”

Regardless of the tax policies that Oklahoma’s political leaders choose to follow, they should always keep in mind that tax policies require constant consideration to maintain a competitive edge among the many states. Additionally, any changes should be enacted gradually and over a long period of time. This allows businesses and individuals the time they need to adjust their financial practices accordingly. Over the next few years, it will be interesting to see how the new tax policy works for Oklahoma and how it will impact state elections.

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**TO FLY, OR NOT TO FLY?:
ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING IN A RESPONSIBLE CITIZENRY**

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When I was a young, wet-behind-the-ears forecaster at Tinker Air Force Base, a couple of high-ranking Navy pilots came into the weather station to get a weather briefing for their cross-country flight. While it was a beautiful day in Oklahoma, there was a line of thunderstorms all along the front range of the Rockies, which prevented their next leg toward California.

Being pilots, they naturally wanted to fly, especially when it is to their homes and families. Being experienced, high-ranking pilots, they proceeded to use all the tools at their disposal to convince me to give them an overly optimistic briefing that would allow them to get home. From pointing out “breaks” in the line of storms, to telling me their planes were capable of flying over the storm tops, and even their rank, they tried everything they could to convince me to let them fly.

Admittedly, there was a point during the exchange when I thought about giving them the optimistic conditions they wanted, if only to get them out of my hair. However, I was confident that conditions were too dangerous for them, and I told them that there was no way I could sign off on a “go” weather briefing. After spending a few more minutes trying to convince me to change my mind, they told me they would be back in an hour to see if the conditions had improved.

I was dreading their return until I noticed a map with continuous line of National Weather Service warning boxes blocking their flight path. I then remembered that Navy pilots were legally prohibited from flying through NWS warning boxes. That glorious line of warnings did three things. First, it lifted a huge weight off my shoulders. Second, it justified my decision. Finally, it convinced the “Top Guns” to begrudgingly say “thank you” and ask for the base hotel’s number.

Looking back on this event through the lenses of twenty-some odd years’ experience, I am awed by the scary degree of trust the military places in such young men and women. I was indeed only 23 years old when this event happened, but it is not uncommon to see 18-year-olds manning forecast desks. These inexperienced kids are entrusted to guide multi-million dollar aircraft through an atmosphere that top-of-the-line supercomputers cannot accurately forecast beyond a couple of days’ time. That is an awesome responsibility to place on such young shoulders. To top it all off, this episode was in peacetime. Many—too many, some say—of these decisions are being made under the added pressure of battle.

I was forced to think back on the pressure the pilots were applying, and it made me wonder, “What would’ve happened had I acquiesced?” As with any “what if” question, there are several alternate timelines. One of the scariest timelines includes an aircraft mishap costing not only a very expensive airplane, but also a human life. Another is that nothing bad happened during that particular mission, positively reinforcing a bad decision. Thankfully, in most situations,

some safeguards are in place to minimize the likelihood of one bad decision causing a disaster. Unfortunately, the number of those safeguards shrinks the higher up the chain of command one goes.

Most citizens will rarely find themselves having to make such life or death decisions. However, they do have regular opportunities to make decisions with stakes that are just as high – voting. Per political scientists Green and Gerber, thanks to the many layers of federal, state, and local government, Americans have more opportunities to vote each decade than Britons, Germans, or Japanese have in their lifetime (Green & Gerber, 1). Sadly, very few citizens take advantage of them. According to University of Florida estimates, Oklahoma’s voter turnout in this year’s election was a paltry 29.8 percent, fourth lowest in the country (McDonald). Furthermore, per the non-partisan group Oklahoma Watch, this year’s turnout is quite possibly the lowest ever for the state (Robson). That means that some two million Oklahomans made a conscious decision *not* to select their federal, state, and local government officials, voice their opinion on state questions, or shape the state’s judicial policy. Two million citizens rejected the democratic principles for which countless people fought and died. It is difficult for me to find justifiable reasons for such a rejection, but research indicates there are many reasons given.

According to a 2006 survey by the Pew Research Center, the top four reasons given by Americans either not registered to vote or registered, but rarely vote, are as follows:

1. They know little about the candidates.
2. They are bored by what goes on in Washington, D.C.
3. They feel that voting does not change things.
4. They feel that issues in Washington, D.C., do not affect them (“Who Votes, Who Doesn’t, and Why”).

In today’s information age, everything a voter needs to know about a candidate (and then some) is just a few keystrokes and mouse-clicks away. This powerful access to information suggests that the primary problem lies among the other three reasons given.

The citizen’s boredom with the goings-on in Washington is certainly a complex problem to solve. In a country rapt by the everyday lives of the Kardashians, how can politics compete? The answer lies in the (apparently) unfelt and unseen effects of the federal government on the non-voting citizen. Renowned political scientist V.O. Key said it best, “The blunt truth is that politicians and officials are under no compulsion to pay much heed to classes and groups of citizens that do not vote” (Martin 110). With only one in three citizens voting, is it any wonder that most citizens feel disconnected from their government? Dr. Key’s premise is most clearly supported by the longstanding practice of so-called “pork-barrel” projects—federally-funded projects that often pump money back into a congressional member’s district. This money pleases the voters, who then reelect the politician responsible. While some non-voters also benefit from these projects, none of them can shape or focus the projects to maximize the benefits as can voters.

Not only do inactive citizens not make their voice heard in the political realm, they also provide a platform upon which politicians insert their own interpretations. In an op-ed article in the *Washington Examiner*, Byron York analyzed the following comment by President Obama after the

2014 election: “To everyone who voted, I want you to know that I hear you, to the two-thirds of voters who chose not to participate in the process yesterday, I hear you, too.” Despite the voters’ resounding rejection of his policies, the president explained that two-thirds of the eligible voters somehow supported him *by not voting* (York). Such comments perpetuate the fallacy that inaction sends a message—that not voting is just as powerful as voting. In reality, inaction is just that—doing nothing and remaining silent. If anything, silence only serves to deafen politicians to the voice of the voters. Voting is the only way to be truly heard, and it requires action by the citizen.

The rewards of voting are not limited to the federal level. According to studies conducted after the Voting Rights Act of 1965, state and local level politicians “have successfully shifted political rewards in line with political participation. Groups that participate at lower levels ... receive comparatively worse services and treatment by elected officials who have incentives to reward higher voting groups” (Martin 111). After a citizen realizes the impact and power inherent in their vote, interest in the issues will increase, inspiring research into the candidates’ positions, and enabling him/her to make the effort to cast an educated vote. That vote is, at its core, a conscious, ethical decision that not only benefits the voter, but also reestablishes the lost connection between the citizenry and the government. Once the citizen/government connection is made, the citizen’s power can then be wielded in many other ways, such as communicating with elected officials, working in a campaign, and even running for office.

With a citizen’s power comes great responsibility. The results of the irresponsible use of that power (such as not voting, uninformed voting, or abstinence from the political process) are evident in the public’s perception of the government as an unresponsive, inefficient, disconnected entity. Furthermore, it limits the number and variety of candidates, reduces campaigns to little more than character attacks (i.e., mudslinging), and encourages government waste. An apathetic citizenry is akin to a driver asleep at the wheel or a parent too distracted to notice when it gets unusually quiet in their toddler’s playroom. Only with an unsupervised government, the stakes are incredibly higher.

A government is responsible only to those who vote—its active citizens. As the numbers of active citizens increase, the more responsible government becomes, ultimately returning to—as so eloquently described by Abraham Lincoln in his Gettysburg address—a “government of the people, by the people, for the people” (America’s Homepage). Such a government, with its power residing in its citizenry (rather than a small contingent thereof), would soar to never-before-seen greatness.

As a young military serviceman, I was required to make many difficult decisions. The one I shared with you today prevented two older, wiser, and highly experienced people from flying into an unnecessarily dangerous path. In his 1936 essay “Shooting an Elephant,” George Orwell while working as police officer in British Burma knuckled under the pressure of an uneducated mob interested only in spectacle. Americans now face a similar decision. We can choose to remain an uneducated mob focused only on the next episode of “reality” television, allowing others to decide our fate and the path (no matter how perilous) our country will travel, or we can choose to become an engaged, educated and vigilant citizenry, determining our own and our country’s fate.

Throughout America's history, citizens have fought tirelessly for equality. As demonstrated above, there is no greater equalizer than a vote. Become an active citizen. Register to vote, and encourage others to do as well. Study the issues—read and listen critically. Base your opinion on more than just a sound bite or party lines. Be democracy's example for the world, not just during a presidential election, but at each of the many chances you get. Make the decision. Make a difference. Let your vote fly.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Shawn Holliday. *The Oklahoma Poets Laureate: A Sourcebook, History, and Anthology*. Norman, Oklahoma: Mongrel Empire Press, 2015.

The Oklahoma Poets Laureate: A Sourcebook, History, and Anthology is a unique work that provides historical perspective on the poet laureate position and biographical information and selected works from each individual who has held the position in Oklahoma since its inception in 1923. Holliday's impetus for undertaking the project derives from his innate sense of curiosity about the literary history of the state and the paucity of previous Oklahoma literary anthologies. He expresses his disbelief in the absence of support for local literature from the University of Oklahoma Press, a tradition that he became accustomed to by virtue of his Appalachian roots. Ultimately, Holliday hopes that readers will develop a more appreciative view of Oklahoma poetry and a greater understanding of the state and its people.

The introduction presents an informative and entertaining history of the poet laureate that traces the idea's origin to ancient Greece. As an appointed position, the tradition made its way to twentieth-century America via seventeenth-century England. Holliday states that the American consciousness held negative connotations regarding the idea of a national poet. Subsequently, it would be well over two hundred years before Robert Penn Warren first accepted the national position in 1986. As the introduction explains, many state governments in the south and west created the position specifically to combat negative stereotypes held by the northeastern literary elite, such as political conservatism and cultural backwardness. Additionally, the poet laureate position bolstered the promotion of local culture, tourism, and industry in isolated areas.

Oklahoma would become the fifth state to appoint a poet laureate, and the position would immediately be tied to political controversy; this pattern would continue well into the 1990s. During this period, the appointment of the poet laureate would become associated with political favors and impulsivity. Additionally, Holliday discusses the negative connotations held by Oklahomans and others that the state's political leadership was comprised of screwballs who engaged in a "never-ending public spectacle." Though a general disinterest in poetry, which stemmed from the Governor's office, would prevail for a time following Oklahoma's first poet laureate appointment, subsequent appointments by Robert S. Kerr illustrated that, for the first time, the complexities of the position were finally being understood and appreciated. Poet laureate appointments would continue to be an exercise in inconsistency; but with the appointment of Jennie Harris Oliver in 1940, the position assumed its intended purpose as a literary ambassador and would become the model for subsequent poets laureate. However, the gubernatorial disinterest and political ineptitude exhibited by the state of Oklahoma would continue to handicap the position.

David Walters, who served as Governor from 1991 to 1995, ushered into modernity the position of Oklahoma poet laureate by supporting legislation that would mandate appointments by January 1 of every odd year. Two notable and more recent appointees, Francine Ringold and N. Scott Momaday, a Pulitzer Prize winner, have shown that the poet laureate can do much more than simply promote poetry within the state. They have also, as Holliday notes, "helped to raise

Oklahoma's literary stock." With appointments up to the present day, there is reason for optimism as Oklahoma's governors are interested in promoting progressive and imaginative verse from individuals with academic backgrounds. This trend demonstrates a promising future for Oklahoma poetry.

The Oklahoma Poets Laureate: A Sourcebook, History, and Anthology furnishes a short biographical sketch and selected works from each of the state's poets laureate. Subsequently, the reader can explore each poet's connection to Oklahoma and gain insight into their intended message, style, and influences. Through an exploration of the personalities and lives of the poets laureate, one gains a greater understanding of how the state and the position have grown.

The Oklahoma Poets Laureate: A Sourcebook, History, and Anthology shines in its ability to add depth and relevancy to a neglected topic. Additionally, Holliday illustrates how Oklahoma's political and literary history are inextricably linked. Readers of this book will gain valuable insights into the ways in which literature and poetry can raise social consciousness and act as a catalyst for political change. More important, perhaps, is the role that the promotion of poetry plays in combatting negative cultural stereotypes that are held in other regions of the country. Holliday concludes that, "Many governments created this position to promote the idea that their states were civilized places that held unique cultural offerings." In addition to the promotion of tourism and industry and bolstering state pride, the poet laureate position has been a catalyst for the journey toward cultural maturity through the increased awareness of home-grown traditions and values. This book will be a valuable resource for students and educators who desire to know more about the poets laureate and the position's relationship to the cultural and literary development of the state of Oklahoma.

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Gary Reiswig. *Land Rush: Stories from the Great Plains*. Bloomington, Indiana: Archway Publishing, 2014.

Gary Reiswig has lived a full life as a well-traveled farmer, pastor, educator, city planner, businessman, and author. Perhaps noting that he has lived many different "lives" is a more accurate description. But his early days growing up on a farm in the Oklahoma Panhandle taught him many of life's most important lessons, which his most recent book, *Land Rush: Stories from the Great Plains*, makes clear.

Land Rush is part memoir and part fiction, intended for a more popular reading audience and not only for Germans from Russia, though the last chapter concerns his Volga German family background (his maternal side was Scottish) and history of more than two centuries of migration across Europe and eventually to Kansas and Oklahoma. Perhaps also of interest to Germans from Russia (especially of Volga German pedigree) is his book published in 2010 and based on his family research, *The Thousand Mile Stare: One Family's Journey through the Struggle and Science of Alzheimer's* (92). Reiswig's work fits into a larger literary trend for the children and grandchildren of German from Russia immigrants who grew up in the middle of the twentieth

century. Significantly, in the early twenty-first century we are now reaching the point when we can carry out a more comprehensive and self-conscious historical reflection of everyday events surrounding various immigrants and their posterity between the 1930s and 1960s in North America.

The younger generation who emerged during and shortly after the Great Depression and the Second World War is fast receding in time. For this generation, like their counterparts in united Germany and the former Soviet Union, a growing number of educated and integrated descendants of Germans from Russia on this side of the Atlantic also have been endeavoring to publish or self-publish professional quality memoirs, short stories, and various other compilations about their early life and their connections with the old heritage. Especially in view of an increasingly fast-paced world, this trend toward introspection among those born between the 1930s and 1950s is the product of the passage of time and the innate need to preserve part of their (and even part of our) story for the future. As a successful full-time writer residing in East Hampton and Manhattan, New York, at this point in his long, varied and accomplished career, Reiswig's literary contribution is notable in this respect.

Readers will find *Land Rush* to be a quick and engaging collection of six stories at just over one hundred pages. Three of the chapters were first published in his memoir and a previous novel. Readers, particularly from his generation, will appreciate his perceptive insights into a world that appears familiar but quickly receding into the past, though the "Friday night lights" culture of Oklahoma football remains as vibrant as ever. For all that, it is refreshing that his writing style and story content appear neither purely sentimental nor nostalgic as such. He confesses in the opening chapter that his father "would lose me, his oldest son, to another profession more suited to my temperament despite how well I understood that farming is an important way of life" (13). Near the end of the last chapter, "Land Rush," he concludes:

My father and sister were the last farmers in the line of farmers for eleven known generations in the Reiswig family that extended backward from the Oklahoma Panhandle, to the steppes of Russia, to the Hessian countryside near Frankfurt, Germany. From the fourteen siblings in my dad's family and eleven in my mother's, one cousin remains on a farm in Western Oklahoma, the last farming descendant from my family who moved west propelled by the forces of Manifest Destiny to participate in the last great land rush (102).

The last land rushes took place in Oklahoma Territory in the 1890s and first years of the 1900s, including land hungry Germans from Russia recently arrived. *Land Rush* contains touching and thoughtful short stories and anecdotes based on his experiences coming of age in the post-Dust Bowl and postwar era in the rough and tumble world of Oklahoma's remote Panhandle, which Reiswig refers to as "no man's land" at the time of the first settlements in 1890. The author further reflects that his father "found the same problem [his ancestor] Johannes had found on the Russian steppes nearly one and [a] half centuries earlier: no trees to build shelter" (96). As in Russia, the first settlers in western Oklahoma had to construct earth dwellings (sod houses) facing away from the north wind.

The Reiswig family's universe was Beaver County, Oklahoma, which is still an arid, relatively depopulated region on the edge of the Southern Plains that had once lay at the Dust Bowl's epicenter. The worst years of the severe drought occurred between 1935 and 1938, but extended

until as late as 1940. Timothy Egan's 2006 well-received book, *The Worst Hard Time: The Untold Story of Those Who Survived the Great American Dust Bowl*, would make an excellent supplement to Reiswig's stories. Egan touches upon those resilient Volga Germans who stayed in Oklahoma during the Dust Bowl years.

Most of the several black and white historic photographs can be found at the book's beginning, as well as a few detailed, hand-drawn Oklahoma maps at the end (with special emphasis on western Oklahoma and the Panhandle). Many of the map locations will prove familiar to the region's residents. Reiswig even makes brief reference to Northwestern Oklahoma State University in Alva.

For those who wish to capture what daily life was like for German-Russians and others in mid-twentieth-century Oklahoma, *Land Rush* is one of the places to start. For more information about Reiswig and his catalogue of writings, please visit his Website at <http://garyreiswigauthor.com/>.

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EDITORIAL POLICY

Approximate Annual Timeline Submissions:

Call for Papers: July 1
 Deadline for submissions: November 1
 Send out submissions to reviewers: November 1
 Receive manuscripts from reviewers: February 1
 Authors receive their examined revisions: March 1
 Authors send their finished product: April 1
 Annual publication: July 1

Book Reviews:

Write on published works in the general parameters of the journal's field of interest (i.e., Citizenship Studies and related fields).

Write on recent published works from the previous 2-3 years.

The typical book review's length should range from approximately 750 to 1,250 words.

The journal editors may consult other form sheets and guidelines for additional ideas to pass along to the authors, but general recommendations include:

- At the top-center of the page, the reviewer should identify the author, book title, place of publication, publisher, and publication date. Italicize or underline all book titles. Here is a standard example:

Jane S. Doe. *The NWOSU Institute for Citizenship Studies*. Alva, Oklahoma: Northwestern Oklahoma State University, 2011.

- Typically, the first paragraph of the book review should include a statement of the author's thesis (major argument) or purpose. Please identify the main points or interpretation the author is trying to present to the reader.
- The main body of the book review should be a synopsis showing how the author did or did not prove his/her thesis. Consider the book's key themes and chapters, the kinds of sources used, and the organizational methods employed (e.g., is it organized by topic or by chronology?). Please elaborate on whether the author demonstrates any kind of bias which you can detect (everyone has a bias). If so, comment on whether the bias detracts from or adds to the study's effectiveness.
- The book review should conclude with a critical evaluation. Is the thesis logically consistent with the materials given to support it in the book? Does it make sense to the

reader? Is it convincing? Is it engaging or boring? Has the book helped the reader's understanding of the subject? How? Why? If possible, how does the book relate to the broader objectives and material comprising the field of Citizenship Studies and related fields?

- At the end of the essay, the reviewer will double-space and add his/her full name, department and institution/affiliation.

General Articles:

Write on topics in the general parameters of the journal's field of interest (i.e., Citizenship Studies and related fields).

Each article's length should generally not exceed approximately 8,000 words. Exceptions are possible, of course, including article series.

Documentation of Sources in Articles/Reviews:

Since the journal is interdisciplinary, so long as authors are consistent and concise in their academic writing, they may employ the documentation style familiar to their area of specialization (Chicago Manual of Style, Turabian, MLA, etc.).



JESSE DUNN HALL—HOME OF THE INSTITUTE

The largest classroom building on the Alva campus, Jesse Dunn Hall, located on the northeast side of Northwestern Oklahoma State University, was constructed in 1936-1937 on the site of the original campus building, the Castle on the Hill, which burned down the previous year. The building was dedicated on March 14, 1937, by First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt. By an Oklahoma Senate Concurrent Resolution, the new classroom building was named for Jesse J. Dunn, an Alva attorney and Oklahoma Supreme Court Justice. Photo comes courtesy of Valerie Case, Northwestern Oklahoma State University (Alva).